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Technological Tethereds: Potential
Impact of Untrustworthy Artificial
Intelligence in Criminal Justice Risk
Assessment Instruments
Sonia M. Gipson Rankin*
Abstract
Issues of racial inequality and violence are front and center
today, as are issues surrounding artificial intelligence (“AI”).
This Article, written by a law professor who is also a computer
scientist, takes a deep dive into understanding how and why
hacked and rogue AI creates unlawful and unfair outcomes,
particularly for persons of color.
Black Americans are disproportionally featured in criminal
justice, and their stories are obfuscated. The seemingly endless
back-to-back murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, Ahmaud
Arbery, and heartbreakingly countless others have finally shaken
the United States from its slumbering journey towards
intentional criminal justice reform. Myths about Black crime
and criminals are embedded in the data collected by AI and do
not tell the truth about race and crime. However, the number of
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on this paper. I am grateful to my wonderful research assistants, Lauren
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Black people harmed by hacked and rogue AI will dwarf all
historical records, and the gravity of harm is incomprehensible.
The lack of technical transparency and legal accountability
leaves wrongfully convicted defendants without legal remedies if
they are unlawfully detained based on a cyberattack, faulty or
hacked data, or rogue AI. Scholars and engineers acknowledge
that the artificial intelligence that is giving recommendations to
law enforcement, prosecutors, judges, and parole boards lacks
the common sense of an eighteen-month-old child. This Article
reviews the ways AI is used in the legal system and the courts’
response to this use. It outlines the design schemes of proprietary
risk assessment instruments used in the criminal justice system,
outlines potential legal theories for victims, and provides
recommendations for legal and technical remedies to victims of
hacked data in criminal justice risk assessment instruments. It
concludes that, with proper oversight, AI can increase fairness in
the criminal justice system, but without this oversight, AI-based
products will further exacerbate the extinguishment of liberty
interests enshrined in the Constitution.
According to anti-lynching advocate, Ida B. Wells-Barnett,
“The way to right wrongs is to turn the light of truth upon them.”
Thus, transparency is vital to safeguarding equity through AI
design and must be the first step. The Article seeks ways to
provide that transparency, for the benefit of all America, but
particularly persons of color who are far more likely to be
impacted by AI deficiencies. It also suggests legal reforms that
will help plaintiffs recover when AI goes rogue.
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INTRODUCTION

In Jordan Peele’s 2019 widely praised film, Us, protagonist
Adelaide meets her doppelgänger, who then proceeds to
terrorize Adelaide’s family.1 This look-alike is described as her
“Tether,” the product of a failed and disbanded United States
government experiment, deemed harmless and left to remain
below ground.2 The “Tethered” escape from their confinement
intent on replacing the above-ground community.3 This film
captures a growing tension in science and society of artificial
intelligence (“AI”) today: what happens when AI does not
operate as intended? Having AI serve as the foundation of risk
assessment instruments, particularly in criminal justice allows
instances of benign neglect, nefarious actors, and unintended
consequences to change the outcomes in ways that harm
society.4 In other words, AI is as likely to contribute to racism in
the law as it is a means to end it.
The courts have yet to address legal issues related to easily
hackable AI. Further, the current remedies in place do not offer
sufficient recourse for either wrongfully incarcerated
defendants or harmed third parties. The criminal justice
flowchart is well established. A defendant is arrested for a
crime, granted or denied bail, convicted, and sentenced,
sometimes with a possibility of being eligible for parole. AI has
been used to augment every stage of the criminal justice

1. US (Universal Pictures 2019); see Tasha Robinson, Jordan Peele’s Us
Turns a Political Statement into Unnerving Horror, VERGE (Mar. 22, 2019,
10:47 AM), https://perma.cc/TK7F-RA6E.
2. See Tasha Robinson, Does the Ending of Jordan Peele’s Us Play Fair
With the Audience?, VERGE (Mar. 25, 2019, 3:32 PM), https://perma.cc/ALM75K8M.
3. See id. This theme is also explored in the highly regarded Netflix
series, Stranger Things. The “upside-down” reflects a distorted version of a
small community where the corrupted inhabitants of the mirrored society
cross blurred boundaries. See Ashley Strickland, The Weird Upside Down
Science Behind ‘Stranger Things’, CNN (July 4, 2019, 9:55 AM),
https://perma.cc/68F6-TAXJ.
4. See United States v. Curry, 965 F.3d 313, 344–46 (4th Cir. 2020)
(Thacker, J., concurring) (emphasizing the potential for harm from predictive
policing algorithms that may use data that reflects and reinforces racial
biases).
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decision-making process.5 Law enforcement uses facial
recognition drones that report a high probability that the
defendant has committed a crime.6 Using a pretrial risk
assessment instrument, the prosecutor recommends to the court
that the defendant not be eligible for bail because the software
identifies the defendant as a flight risk or a danger to the
community.7 The judge sentences the defendant after consulting
a risk assessment instrument that gives a recommended
sentence.8 The parole board consults another risk assessment
instrument that computes its determination of the defendant’s
release, parole, or probation.9 Without question, these issues
disproportionately affect Black people, Indigenous people, and
other communities of color.
Black Americans are disproportionally featured in criminal
justice, and their stories are obfuscated. The seemingly endless

5. From surveillance to pretrial sentencing to probation. For more on
surveillance, see Molly Griffard, A Bias-Free Predictive Policing Tool?: An
Evaluation of the NYPD’s Patternizr, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 43, 44 (2019). For
more on pretrial sentencing, see generally Brandon L. Garrett & John
Monahan, Judging Risk, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 439 (2020). For more on probation,
see Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2278 (2019);
Cade Metz & Adam Satariano, An Algorithm That Grants Freedom, or Takes
It Away, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/UV2Q-PK3S (last updated
Feb. 7, 2020).
6. See Bobby Allyn, ‘The Computer Got It Wrong’: How Facial
Recognition Led to False Arrest of Black Man, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 24, 2020,
8:00 AM) (last updated June 24, 2020, 9:05 PM), https://perma.cc/Q2AS-9LP7
(detailing the false arrest of a Black male following a faulty facial recognition
match); Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Baltimore Hopes Surveillance Planes
Lower Crime, but Residents Fear Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://perma.cc/N5FL-PPU7 (last updated June 3, 2020) (discussing the use
of surveillance planes by the Baltimore Police Department).
7. See Rodgers v. Laura & John Arnold Found., No. 17-5556, 2019 WL
2429574, at *1 (D.N.J. June 11, 2019) (summarizing a “data-based” risk
assessment algorithm which provides quantitative scores and a
“decision-making framework” to assist courts in “assess[ing] the risk that [a]
criminal defendant will fail to appear for future court appearances or commit
additional crimes and/or violent crimes if released”).
8. See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 769 (Wis. 2016).
9. See Risk Assessment Landscape: Public Safety Risk Assessment
Clearinghouse, BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE, https://perma.cc/98EA-QML3
(providing an overview of the various risk assessment tools used across the
country at different decision points in the criminal justice system).
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back-to-back murders of George Floyd,10 Breonna Taylor,11
Ahmaud Arbery,12 and heartbreakingly countless others have
finally shaken the United States from its slumbering journey
towards intentional criminal justice reform.13 The degradation
of Black bodies at the hands of law enforcement and domestic
terrorists has changed the narrative and halted many widely
repeated tropes and excuses of “tough on crime” and
“Black-on-Black crime” rhetoric.14 Myths are embedded in the
data collected and do not tell the truth about race and crime in
the United States.15 The number of Black people harmed by
manipulated algorithms will dwarf all documented historical
records, and the gravity of harm is incomprehensible.
Imagine that a defendant has been convicted and sentenced
using hacked software, at any point in the criminal justice
process. In one scenario, the defendant receives a longer
sentence than what would have been given but for the hacked
software. In another, imagine the hacked software erred,
recommending a lighter penalty, and the defendant injures a
third party while released. Attacks on data are not only possible
and probable but have indeed occurred; this can negatively
10. See Tim Arango et al., Footage of Police Body Cameras Offers
Devastating Account of Floyd Killing, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2020),
https://perma.cc/335P-B4XK (last updated Aug. 11, 2020).
11. See Rukmini Callimachi, Breonna Taylor’s Family Claims She Was
Alive after Shooting but Given No Aid, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2020),
https://perma.cc/DJE7-FGMR (last updated Sept. 23, 2020).
12. See Richard Fausset, Suspects in Ahmaud Arbery’s Killing Are
Indicted on Murder Charges, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2020),
https://perma.cc/GYT2-HR55 (last updated June 26, 2020).
13. See Michael Harriot, A Timeline of Events That Led to the 2020 ‘Fed
Up’-rising, ROOT (May 30, 2020, 1:52 PM), https://perma.cc/B5ME-SBZ9.
14. See Hannah Allam, FBI Announces That Racist Violence Is Now
Equal Priority to Foreign Terrorism, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 10, 2020, 4:17
PM), https://perma.cc/LL6F-BACX (covering the announcement of the FBI
that the agency made hate-fueled violence a top national security priority, on
par with foreign terrorist groups). To understand how pervasive these tropes
have been used, see generally Bernard D. Headley, “Black on Black” Crime:
The Myth and the Reality, 20 CRIME & SOC. JUST. 50 (1983) and Evan Stark,
The Myth of Black Violence, 38 SOC. WORK 485 (1993).
15. See Mayson, supra note 5, at 2227–49 (arguing that the inequality
exposed by algorithmic risk assessment should “galvanize a more fundamental
rethinking of the way in which the criminal justice system understands and
responds to risk”).
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impact the administration of justice.16 Inevitable questions
arise: What are the legal accountability mechanisms available
to address the unknowns of cyberattacks, falsified data, and the
unintended consequences created by using unmonitored
artificial intelligence? And, does the current rubric of
“obstruction of justice,” with the fixed statute of limitations,
provide enough of a deterrent for would-be bad actors?
The implementation of AI in legal spaces has brought great
promise. An array of legal scholars, scientists, and businesses
believe that embedding AI into criminal justice reform can lead
the United States to a more effective and efficient, bias-free
system no longer centered on entrenched historical racism.17
This Article is not a manifesto against tech and AI in the
practice of law. Yet, without transparent safeguards to ensure
that data sources have not been manipulated, criminal justice
risk assessment instruments must not be used to administer
justice. Additionally, this lack of oversight and transparency
will have a disproportionate impact on Black people, people of
color, and people with low socioeconomic status in the criminal
justice system.
Part I of this paper explains the ways AI architecture leaves
itself vulnerable to attacks. It describes different cyberattacks
such as malware, including computer viruses, worms, and
botnets, and Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks. It also
outlines the damage by cyberattacks, camouflaged and
manipulated data sets, and the unintended outcomes produced
by AI. All these and more are the ways that AI can be corrupted
to change the integrity of the outcome and undermine a fair
criminal justice system. Part II outlines the design schemes of
two proprietary risk assessment instruments used in the
16. See infra Part III.A.
17. See generally Katheryn Russell-Brown, Racial Profiling: A Status
Report of the Legal, Legislative, and Empirical Literature, 3 RUTGERS RACE &
L. REV. 61 (2001); Kenneth B. Nunn, Rights Held Hostage: Race, Ideology and
the Peremptory Challenge, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63 (1993); Paul Butler,
One Hundred Years of Race and Crime, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1043
(2010); Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve & Lauren Mayes, Criminal Justice Through
“Colorblind” Lenses: A Call to Examine the Mutual Constitution of Race and
Criminal Justice, 40 L. & SOC. REV. 406 (2015); Naomi Murakawa & Katherine
Beckett, The Penology of Racial Innocence: The Erasure of Racism in the Study
and Practice of Punishment, 44 L. & SOC’Y REV. 695 (2010).
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criminal justice system, Correctional Offender Management
Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (“COMPAS”) and the Arnold
Tool, and how they hinder justice. Part III documents potential
legal theories of accountability and liability available to victims
of hacked data in the criminal justice system. Part IV provides
recommendations for legal and tech remedies to victims of
hacked data in criminal justice risk assessment instruments.
Finally, this Article concludes that vigilant oversight is
necessary to ensure victims of hacked data are permitted
recourse.
I.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CAN BE HACKED AND
WEAPONIZED

This Part provides technical background on data
procurement and how AI depends on secure data. It also outlines
a general background on cybersecurity, cyberattacks, and
hacking, and how AI can be hacked and otherwise produce
unexpected outcomes. An understanding of these matters
contextualizes the flaws in the overreliance or blind reliance on
data.
A.

What Is Artificial Intelligence and How Is It Used?

AI is used to make sense of data produced in the legal
system, and the legal community must understand hacked data.
Failure to do so renders the law unable to appreciate present
and future threats from technology.18 Machine-learning
algorithms have fundamentally transformed how life occurs,
18. As AI becomes more embedded in our shared legal lexicon, more
clients will begin expecting attorneys to have strong competence in
understanding this field. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2012) (requiring a competent lawyer to keep abreast of changes in
the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with
relevant technology). Thirty-eight states have adopted the duty of technology
competence in some form. See Robert Ambrogi, Tech Competence, LAWSITES,
https://perma.cc/ZJ2C-JW7P (listing states that have formally adopted the
duty of technology competence since the ABA formally approved the change to
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 2012). Florida has even required
three out of thirty-three credit hours required every three years must be in
approved technology programs. Mark D. Killian, Court Approves CLE Tech
Component, FLA. BAR (Oct. 15, 2016), https://perma.cc/XCP8-A3EZ.
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impacting hiring,19 access to health care,20 and criminal justice
sentencing.21 AI is relevant to virtually any intellectual task,
and, in the legal community alone, it has affected the practice
and administration of law in many ways for the better. From the
digitization of court proceedings to the automatic transcription
of legal proceedings, there has been a world of innovation that
has impacted and resulted in less administrative and repetitive
and rote work in law practice.22 AI plays a role in more strategic
legal tasks, including emotional intelligence, advanced
problem-solving skills, and creative solutions for improvements
to justice and new areas of ethical and legal conundrums.23 The
potential benefit of using AI in the administration of justice is
expansive, which ushers in an exciting period as the field
evolves.
At present, there is no straightforward way to define what
AI means. Intelligence demonstrated by machines, in contrast
to the natural intelligence displayed by humans, needs to be

19. See Miranda Bogen, All the Ways Hiring Algorithms Can Introduce
Bias, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/4F6M-VRMZ (discussing
whether hiring algorithms prevent bias or amplify it).
20. See Angela Spatharou et al., Transforming Healthcare with AI: The
Impact on the Workforce and Organizations, MCKINSEY & CO. (Mar. 10, 2020),
https://perma.cc/6VHX-QV7J (noting AI’s transformative power on the
delivery of health care).
21. See Judge Noel L. Hillman, The Use of Artificial Intelligence in
Gauging the Risk of Recidivism, AM. BAR ASS’N. (Jan. 1, 2019),
https://perma.cc/8EJK-23A4 (noting concern with the judicial use of AI at
sentencing to predict a criminal defendant’s risk of recidivism and encouraging
courts to meet this technological development “with skepticism and close
scrutiny”).
22. See Cary Coglianese & Lavi M. Ben Dor, AI in Adjudication and
Administration, 85 BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (“The principal
advantages of artificial intelligence in the administrative context are similar
to those in the private sector: accuracy and efficiency.”).
23. What will happen when autopilot arguments can be coded? In what
ways will new branches of law and the development of case law and statutes
affect or impact? What will improvements that have access to justice look like
and feel like in society? These are questions that are raised every time
innovation enters society and the law. See Garrett & Monahan, supra note 5,
at 475–91 (detailing the rise of modern risk assessment AI and noting
concern).
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developed to meet society’s needs.24 In computer science, AI
research is defined as the study of “intelligent agents,” i.e., any
device that perceives its environment and takes actions that
maximize its chance of successfully achieving its goals.25 These
algorithmic
processes
are
intended
to
rationalize
decision-making by minimizing human bias and fallibility.26
Simply put, AI is to capture not just what people think, but more
importantly, how people should think. The implications run
from philosophical to practical. As AI is a newer field in science,
math, and engineering, there is no universal definition that
defines the work, process, and product.27 AI is then any
technique that authorizes the computer “to mimic human
intelligence using logic, if-then rules, decision trees, and
machine learning (including deep learning).”28 AI serves as a

24. Tech companies like Apple, Amazon, and Google have established
themselves as users’ personal secretaries, using AI to guide us through the
day, where we happily deposit our personal, confidential, and private items,
such as calendars, photos, documents, and locations. See FRANKLIN FOER,
WORLD WITHOUT MIND: THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF BIG TECH 2 (2017).
25. KLAUS SCHWAB, THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 11 (2016).
26. The architects of AI theorized that the brain itself was a computer,
controlled by programs, something possible to replicate back into the machine,
though the first ideas for algorithms arose from Gottfried Leibniz, in the late
1600s. See FOER, supra note 24, at 36, 64. Google founders Larry Page’s and
Sergey Brin’s plan was to create a brain that would not be influenced by
human biases, untrustworthy sensory direction, and unexplainable desires
that come from physical bodies. Id. at 38. The same will be true for Facebook.
Id. at 64.
27. Algorithms can be challenging to define, and it is believed that 60
percent of users are still entirely unaware it exists. FOER, supra note 24, at 73.
Algorithms and the giant umbrella of tech innovations that have emerged in
the last five years have and will continue to fundamentally alter the ways we
connect, live, and work in the world. See SCHWAB, supra note 25, at vii. There
is no universal definition, and it is currently being treated in the same way
that people will use the term “Kleenex” to refer to all tissues or “Xerox” to refer
to copying as a genericized trademark. See Christoph Henkel & Ruth C.
Hauswirth, What Law Faculty Need to Know about Artificial Intelligence,
ASS’N AM. L. SCHS. (June 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/FCE8-WX4W (noting that
there are multiple subfields in addition to there being no universal definition
of AI).
28. Roger Parloff, Why Deep Learning Is Suddenly Changing Your Life,
FORTUNE (Sept. 28, 2016, 5:00 PM), https://perma.cc/Y643-A7BQ; see Meenal
Dhande, What Is the Difference between AI, Machine Learning and Deep
Learning?, GEOSPATIAL WORLD (July 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/F4N7-PUJD
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universal term that is used to describe various
machine-learning predictive technologies that can be applied to
give users a window into large amounts of data, eliminate
irrelevant information, and organize data for increased review,
efficiency, and accuracy.
Algorithms capture the process for solving a problem within
a system, but neither give nor expect a proscribed correct,
definitive answer. Algorithms define the process through which
a decision is made, and AI uses that data to make decisions. AI
has many more legal complexities.29 The AI can determine what
data it thinks is the most valuable and reevaluate importance
independent of the developer’s intent. Additionally, data is
messy. If bad data is input, then the AI will produce inaccurate
results.
Since 2015, AI has become faster, less expensive, and more
powerful.30 Because of infinite storage and seemingly unlimited
minable data, there are infinite possibilities available through
AI.31 Machine-learning (of which deep learning is a subset) is a
type of AI that includes gives computers the ability to learn
without being explicitly programmed.32 The machine-learning
(articulating the interconnected nature of AI, machine-learning, and deep
learning).
29. See Bridget Watson, A Mind of Its Own—Direct Infringement by Users
of Artificial Intelligence Systems, 58 IDEA 65, 70 (2017)
Part I discusses the evolution of artificial intelligence, the creative
thinking capabilities of artificial intelligence systems, how direct
infringement by an artificial intelligence system might occur,
multiple parties involved in a single artificial intelligence system,
and indemnification.
30. See Michael Copeland, What’s the Difference Between Artificial
Intelligence, Machine Learning and Deep Learning?, NVIDIA (July 29, 2016),
https://perma.cc/FM5J-MGQC (stating that the explosion of AI has a lot “to do
with the wide availability of GPUs that make parallel processing ever faster,
cheaper, and more powerful . . . [and] practically infinite storage and a flood of
data”).
31. See id.
32. “Artificial intelligence” was used from the 1950s to the 1980s to
describe the field. “Machine-learning” was used from the 1980s to the 2010s.
“Deep learning” has been the best way to describe this work since then. See
Bella Wilson, Major Milestones of Artificial Intelligence from 1949 to 2018,
MEDIUM (Apr. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/27DL-QZXK (listing the most
important developments of AI, including the different terms used to refer to
AI).
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process defines a problem, prepares the data33 (separating
training data from test data),34 trains the model,35 and finally
deploys the machine-learning (watching for automation bias).36
Deep learning is a type of machine-learning where the
computer is trained to perform human-like tasks, such as image
identification, recognizing speech, and making predictions.37
However, instead of using predefined equations, deep learning
sets up basic parameters about the data and trains the computer
to learn independently.38 Deep learning is made up of
algorithms that allow the software to teach itself to perform
tasks by exposing multi-layered neural networks to copious
amounts of data.39 One of the best examples of this is AlphaZero,
where, in 2017, the computer was able to beat a chess master
after learning the game in four hours.40 Open-source
33. See Rashida Richardson et al., Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil
Rights Violations Impact Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and Justice,
94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 192, 192 (2019) (noting concern about the use of “dirty data”
from corrupt, racially-biased, or unlawful police practices in algorithmic tools
to support predictive policing).
34. See Cassandra Laskowski, AI Fundamentals for Faculty, ASS’N AM. L.
SCHS. (July 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/J9DC-V8DP (discussing the stages of
machine-learning systems).
35. See Anup Bhande, What Is Underfitting and Overfitting in Machine
Learning and How to Deal with It, MEDIUM (Mar. 11, 2018),
https://perma.cc/96CL-3LA7 (explaining that how well a model fits to a data
set determines whether the model will yield accurate results); Ali Svoboda,
Applied Regression Analysis: Project 2, RPUBS (Mar. 19, 2015),
https://perma.cc/2STZ-VYKK (experimenting with a dataset of information on
houses to see if the house price could be explained by the square footage, age,
and features of the home).
36. “Automation bias refers to a specific class of errors people tend to
make in highly automated decision making contexts, when many decisions are
handled by automated aids (e.g., computers), and the human actor is largely
present to monitor on-going tasks.” Linda J. Skitka, Automation Bias, UNIV.
ILL. CHI. (2011), https://perma.cc/JN4V-BP52.
37. See Deep Learning: What It Is and Why It Matters, SAS,
https://perma.cc/FH34-J5ZA.
38. See id.
39. See Dhande, supra note 28 (explaining that deep learning “uses some
machine learning techniques to solve real-world problems by tapping into
neural networks that simulate human decision-making,” requiring huge
datasets to train itself).
40. Coding a computer to play chess requires three components: the rules
(bishop moves diagonally), strategies (castling), and a goal (claim the king).
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machine-learning libraries like Sonnet, released by Google,
makes it easier for developers to build neural network
components.41 Another example of how deep learning works is
examining the use of Google to have a translation agent that
gives correction ideas. Google translation scans millions of books
to look for patterns.42 Usually, “quick brown” is followed by “fox;”
thus, the software looks for inferences from patterns in
writing.43 For speech recognition, it had a 90 percent
understanding rate.44 However, that means one in ten words
was wrong. The computer had to process an algorithm that

DeepMind, creators of AlphaZero, “said the difference between AlphaZero and
its competitors is that its machine-learning approach is given no human input
apart from the basic rules of chess. The rest works out by playing itself over
and over with self-reinforced knowledge.” Samuel Gibbs, AlphaZero AI Beats
Champion Chess Program after Teaching Itself in Four Hours, GUARDIAN (Dec.
7, 2017, 7:41 AM), https://perma.cc/8BPK-PJUQ. AlphaZero was given no
rules, strategies, or goals and had to learn them all by only playing the game.
Id. DeepMind found that this approach made AlphaZero learn in a “more
human-like approach,” searching for moves, processing around eighty
thousand positions per second in chess. Id.; see David Silver et al., A General
Reinforcement Learning Algorithm That Masters Chess, Shogi, and Go
Through Self-Play, SCI. MAG. (Dec. 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/4UXH-WMBQ
(detailing the achievements of the AlphaGo Zero program); see also FOER,
supra note 24, at 52–53 (discussing deep learning’s potential to evolve to do
everything).
41. See Mariya Yao, 12 Amazing Deep Learning Breakthroughs of 2017,
FORBES (Feb. 5, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://perma.cc/4U88-VMFM (reflecting on
the deep learning breakthroughs of 2017—”The Year of AI”).
42. See Quoc V. Le et al., A Neural Network for Machine Translation, at
Production Scale, GOOGLE AI BLOG (Sept. 27, 2016), https://perma.cc/SHJ7HRCE (announcing the Google Neural Machine Translation system, which
“utilizes state-of-the-art training techniques to achieve the largest
improvements to date for machine translation quality”).
43. See Tianyi Zhao, The AI Powers behind Google Translate, GEO.
(May 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/5A7Q-SNDV (discussing Google Translate’s
automated recognition of patterns and regularities in data); Gideon
Lewis-Kraus, The Great A.I. Awakening, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2016),
https://perma.cc/2NTF-UZED (explaining Google Translate’s ability to rewire
itself to reflect patterns from the data it absorbs).
44. See Mike Wheatley, Google Makes Its Speech-to-Text and
Text-to-Speech Services More Accurate and Accessible, SILICONANGLE (Feb.
21, 2019), https://perma.cc/DL3V-2ZLT.
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sorted the words.45 This self-directed trial-and-error process is
deep learning. Applied data science, computer science, and
high-tech investment are moving in this direction of such
results.46
AI is a tool, but it can also be used as a weapon. A
multifaceted document, The Malicious Use of Artificial
Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigation, is a 2018
report crafted by fourteen institutions from academia, civil
society, and industry.47 The report outlined the economic,
political, and human labor expenses related to malicious
attacks, new attacks, and changes to the type of character of
threats.48 Similarly, in their article, “How A.I. Could Be
Weaponized to Spread Disinformation,” Cade Metz and Scott
Blumenthal described how weaponized AI could be used to
spread disinformation.49 Another author, Jayshree Pandya, in
“The Weaponization of Artificial Intelligence,” addressed how AI
could be weaponized in cyberwar.50 Misunderstanding the
mathematics of high-dimensional spaces may lead users to false
confidence in the ability of deep neural networks to make the
right decisions.51

45. See Isaac Caswell & Bowen Liang, Recent Advances in Google
Translate, GOOGLE AI BLOG (June 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/F6EN-WAMU
(discussing further advancements in the AI behind Google Translate).
46. See Kevin J. Ryan, Who’s Smartest: Alexa, Siri, and or Google Now?,
INC. (June 3, 2016), https://perma.cc/GA4K-EMK2.
47. MILES BRUNDAGE ET AL., THE MALICIOUS USE OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE: FORECASTING, PREVENTION, AND MITIGATION (2018),
https://perma.cc/8Y3T-SVUS (PDF).
48. Id. They make four high-level recommendations related to
policymaking, reach out to necessary parties about foreseeable harm, identify
best practices, and expand stakeholders and domain experts into the
conversation. See id. at 31 (noting AI is “already being deployed for purposes
such as anomaly and malware detection”).
49. Cade Metz & Scott Blumenthal, How A.I. Could Be Weaponized to
Spread Disinformation, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2019), https://perma.cc/3FCM8W6L.
50. Jayshree Pandya, The Weaponization of Artificial Intelligence,
FORBES (Jan. 14, 2019, 12:51 AM), https://perma.cc/V7ZG-8673.
51. Some other issues include the fact that it can be difficult for networks
to converge, and that GANs have yet to converge on large problems. See
Jonathan Hui, GAN—Why It Is So Hard to Train Generative Adversarial
Networks!, MEDIUM (June 21, 2018), https://perma.cc/N6WC-KSF7 (explaining
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How Data Is Gathered, Analyzed, and Utilized

The top three spaces where attacks occur are through Big
Data,52 the Internet of Things (“IoT”),53 and AI, all of which
compromise confidentiality, integrity, and availability.54 These
three attack surfaces comprise the primary ways data is
gathered, disseminated, and utilized.55
Big Data describes types of data and is an attack surface by
hackers. Big Data’s value comes from four parts: capture,
storage, analysis, and action.56 In creating Big Data, there are
distinct ways that data is procured, and tech companies have
become the biggest gatekeepers of data. For example, Google
provides a hierarchy to information; Facebook uses algorithms
to organize social circles; Amazon watches users’ purchasing
and browsing patterns to recommend further acquisitions.57
Sets of Big Data are gathered, continually, to be used in AI.58
The amount of discoverable data is astronomical. The volume of
Big Data continues to expand, with 2.4 quintillion new bits of
data being created daily.59 It is anticipated that there would be
44 trillion gigabytes by 2020,60 including the capture of every
red light camera video, Fitbit daily steps, meal trackers, grocery
the difficulty in creating and training generative adversarial networks, which
create data as opposed to discriminative models which process data).
52. See Laurel Eckhouse, Opinion, Big Data May Be Reinforcing Racial
Bias in the Criminal Justice System, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2017),
https://perma.cc/WQ72-5G2P.
53. The Internet of Things is defined as the connection via the internet of
all computing devices that transmits and receives data. Eric Brown, Who
Needs the Internet of Things, LINUX.COM (Sept. 13, 2016),
https://perma.cc/SP3M-95XG.
54. See Artificial Intelligence and Robotics National Institute, AM. BAR
ASS’N 469 (2020), https://perma.cc/Q5AD-932N (PDF) (noting the cyber risks
in today’s complex world of tech to the Big Data, Internet of Things, and AI).
55. See id. (listing the three primary attack surfaces).
56. See Why Big Data Is “The New Natural Resource”, WASH. POST,
https://perma.cc/4YLL-2UV4 [hereinafter The New Natural Resource].
57. See FOER, supra note 24, at 4–5. One-third of Amazon purchases come
from recommendations. Id. at 70. Facebook uses upwards of one hundred
thousand “signals” when determining data that a user will see. Id. at 73.
58. See id.
59. See The New Natural Resource, supra note 56.
60. See id.
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orders, and podcasts consumed by persons across the world.61
There is a difference between found data sets and created data
sets. For example, a found data set would be basketball
statistics, street mapping, traffic data and vehicle locations, and
additionally, data from wearable internet which provide
biomedical data from wearable internet such as fitness trackers
and smartphones.62 IoT shares house temperatures and air
quality.63 And even legal decisions have joined the world of data
points. Through the Caselaw Access Project, all cases in United
States history have been digitized and made public and widely
available.64 Each case, date, defendant, and jurisdiction is a data

61. See id. Smart devices, social media, cameras, and sensors will feed
the Internet of Things and prepare for harvesting. See id.
62. Secure locations at military centers were compromised because of
people wearing their Fitbit trackers. Fitness App Strava Lights Up Staff at
Military Bases, BBC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/5MQH-3GYN.
63. JunHo Jo et al., Development of an IoT-Based Indoor Air Quality
Monitoring Platform, 2020 J. SENSORS 1, 2, https://perma.cc/2DHG-42BR
(PDF).
64. See Gallery, CASELAW ACCESS PROJECT, https://perma.cc/9HHE-85P9
(including only some of what has been digitized). In 2018, the Harvard Law
School Library announced its forthcoming project: Caselaw Access Project
(CAP) API that published all United States case law for anyone to access for
no cost. About, CASELAW ACCESS PROJECT, https://perma.cc/AGC4-N8LC.
Between 2013 and 2018, the library digitized forty million pages of United
States court decisions, encompassing almost 6.5 million individual cases. Id.
The digitization of 6.5 million cases for the CAP was an audacious undertaking
and a true marvel. Id. The database purports to have gathered every case from
1658 until 2018, telling the legal story of the United States. Id. It tells our
legal ancestry and provides the “legal genome” path of whom we are and how
we got there through the law. Id. The creation of the database was a huge
undertaking and will fundamentally influence the understanding of patterns
and predictability of cases by jurisdiction, state, and across the nation. Our
ability to interpret evidence of bias in judicial decisions will be simple to
discern after reviewing and parsing the information based on the information
presented. Not only is this audacious collection based on time, but it is also
impressive based on breadth. The collection includes all state, federal, tribal,
and territorial courts, including American Samoa, Dakota Territory, Guam,
Tribal Courts, and the Northern Mariana Islands. Id. Not only is the breadth
broad, but the level of detail included is extensive. Each volume is broken down
to the case-level to include majority and dissenting opinions, with humans
reviewing the data for party names, docket numbers, and dates. Id. This
human-verification process will be vital as we review recent hacks that have
been able to fool AI systems. This project’s full potential is still being
explored/investigated, as users have created Wordclouds, limerick generators,
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point for exploration and extrapolation.65 However, found data
does not always tell the full story. One can have incorrect
labels66 or missing or incorrect data.67
Created data, on the other hand, consists of data sets from
synthesized sources made to mimic real data that can serve as
a “sandbox” for developers to make created data.68 Examples of
created data would be Instagram filters that put sunglasses on
a face or epidemiology models about the distribution of a
vaccine.69 The assumption that test data will be generally
similar to the training data has created its own subfield,
Generative Adversarial Networks (“GANs”).70 Algorithms
capture the process for solving a problem within a system, but
neither give nor expect a proscribed correct, final answer.71
GANs are created when two neural networks train concurrently
to understand that one can serve as a foundation to generate

open-source casebooks, and models to teach people how to write in Python.
Gallery, CASELAW ACCESS PROJECT, https://perma.cc/9HHE-85P9.
65. See About, CASELAW ACCESS PROJECT, supra note 64 (listing key
metadata fields within the digitization process).
66. CLARENCE CHIO & DAVID FREEMAN, MACHINE LEARNING & SECURITY:
PROTECTING SYSTEMS WITH DATA AND ALGORITHMS 279 (Courtney Allen ed.,
2018) (“This bias causes imperfect data and incorrect labels assigned to
samples, affecting the accuracy of the system.”).
67. See id. at 280; see also Eric Westervelt, Did a Bail Reform Algorithm
Contribute To This San Francisco Man’s Murder?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 18,
2017), https://perma.cc/H2UK-V8P2 (“Judge Reardon followed the
recommendation of . . . a computer-generated score that’s used . . . to help
calculate whether a suspect is a flight risk or likely to return to court. . . . In
the case of French, a miscalculation ended in murder.”).
68. See Cody Nash, Create Data from Random Noise with Generative
Adversarial Networks, DEVELOPERS, https://perma.cc/U296-S4JE (explaining
how a GAN-Sandbox is used to generate new credit card data).
69. See Lucas Matney, Instagram’s AR Filters Are Getting More Dynamic,
TECHCRUNCH (May 27, 2020, 4:45 PM), https://perma.cc/6QEQ-RZGD
(discussing the AR that creates Instagram filters).
70. See generally W. Philip Kegelmeyer, Adversarial Issues in Machine
Learning, in 22 NEXT WAVE 10 (2019), https://perma.cc/AAV6-U9B8 (PDF). For
additional ideas on the role of Generative Adversarial Networks, see generally
Steven M. Bellovin et al., Privacy and Synthetic Datasets, 22 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 1 (2019); Russell Spivak, Newest Way to Commit One of the Oldest Crimes,
3 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 339 (2019).
71. See FOER, supra note 24, at 67–69.
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possible outcomes for veracity and probability of occurrence.72
Every day, GANs are improving effectiveness at producing
realistic-looking synthetic samples, though they are unable to
infer, which remains a complex human trait.73 The GAN model
has shown substantial promise, but the existing errors are
significant.74 The samples produced are quite convincing, but
mistakes can include color, style, and in extreme instances,
object identity.75 There are also structural flaws with this model
of developing training sets. The discriminator becomes too
strong too quickly, and the generator ends up not learning
anything.76 Or the generator only learns the particular
weaknesses of the discriminator, and it can take advantage of
these to trick the discriminator into classifying generated data
as real instead of learning to represent the actual data
distribution.77 The generator can also learn only a minimal
subset of the actual data distribution, leading to insufficient
variation in the output.78
AI is designed to learn from training sets made of found
data and created data.79 Training sets are acquired from every

72. See Barry Chen et al., Toward a Deep Learning System for Making
Sense of Unlabeled Multimodal Data, in 22 NEXT WAVE 1, 4 (2019),
https://perma.cc/AAV6-U9B8 (PDF) (“In GANs, two networks compete against
each other: The first one learns features effective for generating input data
realistic enough to fool the second one.”).
73. See Vincent Dumoulin, Adversarially Learned Inference, GITHUB,
https://perma.cc/BH2T-LDY9.
74. See id. (including photographs to visualize the inaccuracies).
75. See id.
76. See Animesh Karnewar, V-GAN (Variational Discriminator
Bottleneck): An Unfair Fight between Generator and Discriminator, MEDIUM
(Nov. 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/2A7L-2HKX (discussing the problem with a
discriminator becoming too powerful). The discriminator classifies generated
data as fake so accurately and confidently that there is nothing in the
discriminator’s back-propagated loss function gradients for the generator to
learn. See id.
77. See id. (“Generally, if the Discriminator becomes too strong, i.e. it can
easily tell the samples apart, it would cease to supply plausible gradients to
the Generator for training.”).
78. See id.
79. See Alex Moltzau, Artificial Intelligence and Training Data, TOWARDS
DATA SCI. (Oct. 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/GK7E-UTTX (“The data used to
build the final model usually comes from multiple datasets.”).
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camera, scanner, and device available.80 Microsoft, Stanford,
and Duke have quietly deleted public face recognition data
sets.81 Over ten million images of one hundred thousand
individuals who had not been asked for nor given their consent
have been removed.82 Although Microsoft has deleted the
database, it is still available to researchers and companies that
had previously downloaded it and this data is still being shared
on open source websites.83 Sometimes, there is data that is not
meant to be included in AI calculations. The Pentagon has had
to remind military troops and defense personnel that in their
quest to reach their daily “10,000” steps via their fitness
trackers, they were inadvertently transmitting sensitive and
secure locations to a third party.84
There are many compelling reasons to be pleased with the
collection of data, and people have benefited from data sharing
across systems through IoT. The productivity increases,
quantifiable improvements in quality of life, and lowering costs
of regular goods and services provide comfort and excitement

80. When Google began its process of digitizing all books, it would arrive
at libraries, trucking away boxes of books and quickly scanning and returning
them. FOER, supra note 24, at 54. “We are not scanning all those books to be
read by people. We are scanning them to be read by an AI.” Id. at 55 (quoting
an unnamed Google engineer).
81. See Madhumita Murgia, Microsoft Quietly Deletes Largest Public Face
Recognition Data Set, FIN. TIMES (June 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/T2Z2-S78B
(explaining that Microsoft, Duke, and Stanford data sets were taken down
after a Financial Times report).
82. See id.
83. See id.
Now it is completely disassociated from any licensing, rules or
controls that Microsoft previously had over it. People are posting it
on GitHub, hosting the files on Dropbox and Baidu Cloud, so there
is no way from stopping them from continuing to post it and use it
for their own purposes.
(quoting Alan Harvey).
84. A twenty-year-old Australian student discovered two years’ worth of
data uploaded by Strava, a social media platform for athletes with
satellite-tracking data for digital fitness devices such as Fitbit. David Martin,
Pentagon Reviews Fitness Tracker Use over Security Concerns, CBS NEWS
(Jan. 29, 2018, 6:51 PM), https://perma.cc/4LAR-7XH5. The tracking outlined
military bases and secure sites across the country and mapped their travel
patterns by time and location. Id.
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about the future.85 With the anticipated trillions of devices such
as smartphones, wearable devices, computers, and tablets,
generating further trillions of data points, the assistance and
surveillance, and ownership of the data will continue to be called
into question.86 While there are many positive applications
associated with enjoying a digital presence,87 those positive
applications do not outweigh the real and concerning threats of
privacy, surveillance, and stolen information being used to
create training sets without the user’s permission.88 And attacks
can occur between interconnected devices. A user may be
comfortable with the data being used to recommend better
running trails, but not to determine if one’s insurance company
will dictate a minimum number of steps required to be eligible
for health insurance.89 And users may not appreciate that a
breach of an individual’s streaming service can lead to entry to
a person’s home security system.90
C.

Public Fears and the Reality of Concerns Related to AI

Doubts about AI are growing. In 2019, the American Bar
Association featured an article penned by Judge Nel L. Hillman
titled “The Use of Artificial Intelligence in Gauging the Risk of
Recidivism.”91 The article outlined three reasons for concern
85. See SCHWAB, supra note 25, at 137 (listing the positive impacts of IoT).
86. See id. at 18. It is anticipated that by 2025, there will be one trillion
sensors connected to the internet. Id. at 26.
87. Such as an increase in transparency, faster interconnectivity between
persons and systems, more space for free speech, faster dissemination of
information, and more efficient use of government systems and resources. See
id. at 123 (listing the positive impacts of digital presence).
88. See Jathan Sadowski, Companies Are Making Money from Our
Personal Data—but at What Cost?, GUARDIAN (Aug. 31, 2016),
https://perma.cc/8ZX9-ZZAR (commenting that the methods and purposes of
data collection range from irritating infringements to major intrusions).
89. See Angela Chen, What Happens When Life Insurance Companies
Track Fitness Data?, VERGE (Sept. 26, 2018, 1:01 PM), https://perma.cc/ZT43GCTJ (considering the privacy concerns involved with insurance policies that
allow customers to share fitness data in exchange for discounts).
90. See Marc Wilczek, Cybercrime: AI’s Growing Threat, DARK READING
(Oct. 4, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://perma.cc/MZ4G-7FK7 (outlining ways IoT can
be hacked).
91. Hillman, supra note 21.
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related to AI in the sentencing process: potential violations of
due process, the limitations of AI related to unacceptable risks
of error and implicit bias, and lastly, that “reliance on AI to
predict recidivism improperly cedes the discretionary
sentencing power to nonjudicial entities.”92 Judge Hillman is
correct on the pulse of significant concerns about the use of AI
in the sentencing process. One of the areas that is receiving the
least attention is how unstable AI is as a developing science,
particularly as it relates to security and the potential for
hacking related to the input data and the produced output
data.93
In a 2017 Pew Research survey poll, 72 percent of U.S.
adults reported they were worried that robots and computers
would do human jobs.94 Those adults reported being three times
more likely to feel worried as compared to enthusiasm about the
role of algorithms in making hiring decisions without human
involvement.95 In the same survey, people were decidedly
reluctant to incorporate unique AI practices into their lives.96
Nevertheless, AI decision-making is happening in every aspect
of people’s lives, without proper vetting.97 Cybersecurity is
consistently treated as an afterthought instead of being
integrated into protocols and principles from the initial design
stage.98 Furthermore, the question is not whether an AI
cyberattack has happened yet, but what is the unknown impact

92. Id.
93. See id. (acknowledging that states only recently introduced AI tools
in sentencing).
94. Compared to 33 percent that were enthusiastic. Monica Anderson, 6
Key Findings on How Americans See the Rise of Automation, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Oct. 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/3UFC-SU63.
95. Id.
96. Id. (“[A]round six-in-ten U.S. adults say they would not want to ride
in a driverless car (56%) or have a robot caregiver for themselves or a family
member (59%).”).
97. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
98. See Barbara Burgess, Businesses Consider Cybersecurity as an
Afterthought despite Growth in Attacks, EY Survey Finds, EY (Feb. 18, 2020),
https://perma.cc/8NDZ-BULY (“Despite the overall growth in cyberattacks,
only one-third of organizations say the cybersecurity function is involved at
the planning stage of a new business initiative . . . .”).
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of the cyberattack that has likely already occurred.99 This Part
further describes types of cyberattacks, how data is hacked, and
what happens when AI is not monitored for bias.
1.

Cyberattacks

Cybersecurity and privacy are areas of concern in AI
development. Over the last seventy-five years, scientists have
been watching and defending against cybersecurity attacks.100
The experts warn that it is not a matter of “if” but rather “when”
we can anticipate, future breaches and hacks to the software.101
Hacking is the act of someone or something gaining
unauthorized access to a computer device or even an
algorithm.102 Hacking finds weaknesses in the security settings,
exploiting them to access confidential information to inject
99. See Wilczek, supra note 90.
100. In 1943, Alan Turing, the “father of Computer Science” led the British
effort that developed the first digital machine that could hack German codes,
known as the “Enigma” code. See Glenn Zorpette, Breaking the Enemy’s Code:
British
Intelligence
Deciphered
Germany’s
Top-Secret
Military
Communications with Colossus, an Early Vacuum-Tube Computer, 24 IEEE
SPECTRUM 47, 47–51 (1987). In 1982, the United States staged a prototype
where they reprogrammed computer equipment intended for a Soviet gas
pipeline that caused the pipeline to explode. See RICHARD M. NEPHEW,
TRANSATLANTIC SANCTIONS POLICY: FROM THE 1982 SOVIET GAS PIPELINE
EPISODE TO TODAY 1 (2019), https://perma.cc/89QL-J2ET (PDF). In 1988, the
first worm was distributed by the Internet and released in November of that
year. See Sihan Qing & Weiping Wen, A Survey and Trends on Internet Worms,
24 COMPUTS. & SEC. 334 (2005), https://perma.cc/2GPH-XC6F. In 1999,
Melissa—the first widespread email worm—and Kak were created and
deployed. See Nick G., The Most Telling Cyber Security Statistics in 2020
[Infographic], TECHJURY, https://perma.cc/ZZ9H-NYZL (last updated Aug. 20,
2020) [hereinafter Cyber Sec Statistics]. In 2003, the Department of Homeland
security began operations creating the national cybersecurity division, and by
2006, NASA had been forced to block emails with attachments before shuttles
were launched out of fear of potential hacking schemes. Id. In 2009, the Aurora
attack hit Google and thirty-three other companies in search of intellectual
property and 2010, the Stuxnet attack was uncovered. Id. This was considered
the first weaponized malware because of its targeted purposely targeted
nature and the fact that it is disrupted Iran’s nuclear program and the
centrifuges used for uranium enrichment. Id.
101. See Cyber Sec Statistics, supra note 100 (“Cyber security statistics
show that this field will only continue to grow commensurately with the
demand. Hackers and cyber criminals aren’t slowing down . . . .”).
102. See id.
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harmful data or applications.103 Between January 2006 and
April 2018, there were over eight thousand recorded breaches in
identity theft resource centers.104 Fifty million Facebook
accounts were affected by an attack in September 2018 and bar
exam students have even found their bar exams hacked.105
There are a plethora of types of cyberattacks,106 and AI has
changed the design and broadened the scope of cyberattacks.107
Malware is defined as malicious software that infects a
computer, and this will include computer viruses, worms, Trojan
horses, spyware, and adware.108 Malware aids hackers to gain
control over the targeted computer or devices to perform forced
103. See id.
104. See Data Breaches, IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., https://perma.cc/NE2RAFNP (including data breach reports from 2005 to present).
105. See Mike Isaac & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Security Breach Exposes
Accounts of 50 Million Users, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018),
https://perma.cc/JB7G-LDED (explaining the ramifications of the breach);
David Jesse, Michigan Online Bar Exam Crashes in Middle of Testing;
Hacking Attempt Blamed, DETROIT FREE PRESS (July 28, 2020),
https://perma.cc/3GQ3-UYEX (reporting the ramifications of Michigan’s
hacked bar exam); Chris Opfer, Florida Scraps Online Bar Exam, Citing
Technology Concerns, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 17, 2020, 8:39 AM),
https://perma.cc/EC64-PWTW (referring to the hacking of Michigan’s exam).
106. They can also include phishing, ransomware, pharming, viruses,
Wi-Fi eavesdropping, and industrial IoT attacks. Types of Cyber Threats and
What They Do, TIE NAT’L (Jan. 24, 2017), https://perma.cc/5U7N-EC4Q.
Ransomware attacks have stymied many local governments throughout the
United State in recent years. Ransomware attacks in Atlanta, Georgia in 2018,
Baltimore, Maryland in 2019, and Greenville, North Carolina in 2020,
removed critical access to data for weeks and cost the cities hundreds of
thousands of dollars to restore and protect the systems. See Alan Blinder &
Nicole Perlroth, A Cyberattack Hobbles Atlanta, and Security Experts
Shudder, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/B3WK-KFAA; Sean
Gallagher, Baltimore Ransomware Nightmare Could Last Weeks More, with
Big Consequences, ARS TECHNICA (May 20, 2019, 12:47 PM),
https://perma.cc/GSZ6-JPLA; Genna Contino, Greenville Water Phone, Online
Payment Systems Restored, GREENVILLE NEWS (Feb. 4, 2020, 10:30 AM),
https://perma.cc/8AVT-EB7N.
107. See generally William Dixon & Nicole Eagan, 3 Ways AI Will Change
the Nature of Cyber Attacks, WORLD ECON. F. (June 13, 2019),
https://perma.cc/GF8M-3C7M (pointing to attacks such as impersonation of
trusted users, attacks in the background, and faster attacks with more
effective consequences).
108. See What Is the Difference: Viruses, Worms, Trojans, and Bots?, CISCO
(June 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/L63E-8RBT.
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actions and access unauthorized data.109 Unlike a virus, worms
live autonomously in the computer’s memory; they do not
damage nor alter the hard drive, but instead send themselves to
other machines in the network, causing damage by shutting
down parts of the network.110 Botnets create an army of infected
computers that act under a hacker’s control, and these infected
units often function in a way that makes the attack
undetectable.111 Bots are mostly discussed in the media in the
context of spreading false information, but bots are also used to
attack computers and networks.112 They can send spam emails,
spread malware, or have Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks
(DDoS).113 In a DDoS attack, a botnet army keeps attacking a
web server, causing it to fail because of an overload, forcing the
web servers to shut down.114

109. See Cyber Sec Statistics, supra note 100. A solid 99.9 percent of
discovered mobile malware was hosted on third party app stores. Id. An app
store is a type of digital distribution platform for computer software called
applications, often in a mobile context, and two of the most popular ones are
Google Play Store and Apple App Store. See J. Clement, Number of Apps
Available in Leading App Stores 2020, STATISTA (Nov. 24, 2020),
https://perma.cc/L38L-AEFY (providing a chart showing the biggest app
stores).
110. See John Markoff, Worm Infects Millions of Computers Worldwide,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2009), https://perma.cc/U93M-LJSK. In 2009, a worm
called Downadup infected almost nine million computers in fourteen days. See
id.
111. See Botnet DDoS Attacks, IMPERVA, https://perma.cc/8SY2-EF7N
(explaining what a botnet is). The number of Windows botnets rose from 29
percent to 34 percent in the first quarter of 2018. Alison DeNisco Rayome,
Major DDoS Attack Lasts 297 Hours, as Botnets Bombard Businesses,
TECHREPUBLIC (Apr. 27, 2018, 5:48 AM), https://perma.cc/97B6-EEHS.
112. See Sam Bocetta, Has an AI Cyber Attack Happened Yet?, INFOQ
(Mar. 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/5Y3F-R6G9 (“These bots can pretty easily be
used for misinformation, like when users marshal them to flood a Twitter
thread with false posters to influence an argument. But they can be used to
DDos the computers and networks of an enemy.”).
113. See Rayome, supra note 111.
114. What
Is
a
DDoS
Attack?,
SUCURI
(Aug.
9,
2019),
https://perma.cc/D8EJ-3LN5.
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Cyberattacks in 2019 and 2020 were rampant.115 Most
companies are unaware of internal and external attacks.116
Experts believe it takes half a year to detect a data breach and
that almost half of all cyberattacks are aimed at small
businesses, with 91 percent of attacks launched with a phishing
email.117 Every fourteen seconds, a business operation falls
victim to a ransomware attack,118 and 38 percent of malicious
attachments are masked and hidden as Microsoft Office types of
files.119 In 2016, cybercriminals exploited 48 percent of U.S.
citizens’ credit cards, and the global cost of online crime is
anticipated to be $6 trillion by 2021.120 In the same way, 62
percent of global organizations have admitted that they are not
equipped to handle a cyberattack.121 Between January and
September 2019, 7.9 billion data records became vulnerable to
data breaches.122 Additionally, undetected software bugs are
another way systems are vulnerable to attack. For example, on
January 29, 2019, it was discovered that an iPhone FaceTime

115. See Cyber Sec Statistics, supra note 100 (“IoT attacks were up by 600
percent in 2017. In 2019, the attacks reached 2.9 billion events.”). In the first
half of 2020, thirty-six billion records were exposed, surpassing the total
number of records exposed for all of 2019 by a factor of two. See RISKBASED
SECURITY, 2020 Q3 REPORT: DATA BREAK QUICKVIEW 10 (2020),
https://perma.cc/W74U-7WAK (PDF).
116. See id. (“Perhaps the more concerning side to cyber security statistics,
in general is the number of incidents that have gone unreported. Speculation
would lead one to believe that the figure of 31% is significantly lower than
reality.”).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See id. Experts studying breaches in 2020 found that 84 percent were
financially motivated. See VERIZON, 2020 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS
REPORT 10 (2020), https://perma.cc/6K3A-LXAY (PDF).
120. See Steve Morgan, Cybercrime to Cost the World $10.5 Trillion
Annually by 2025, CYBERCRIME MAG. (Nov. 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/XNM2K4WL. Some experts see damages related to cyberattacks are expected to
exceed $5 trillion by 2024. Wilczek, supra note 90. Thirty-one percent of
organizations had experienced a cyberattack at the operational infrastructure
level, and the most concerning point is that a number of these incidents have
gone unreported. Cyber Sec Statistics, supra note 100.
121. See Cyber Sec Statistics, supra note 100.
122. See INGA GODDIJN & JAKE KOUNS, DATA BREACH QUICKVIEW REPORT
(2019), https://perma.cc/B9CU-FMJL (PDF).
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bug would allow a person to eavesdrop on any iPhone user.123
One attack against Instagram locked users out of their social
profiles in August 2019,124 and a bug in the code led to a data
breach in November 2019.125 AI cyberattacks are on the rise
because of vulnerable storage services and an increase in data
that people give to companies that are then sold to third-party
companies.126 These are examples of types of attacks that have
been reported; however, because of companies’ private nature, it
is not clear how many companies, software distributors, and
organizations have had data breaches.
Attacks against government entities are particularly
pernicious as they directly impact a necessary part of people’s
daily lives in the United States. A reported 7.3 percent of data
breaches in the United States, from 2014 to 2018, occurred on
government or military entities.127 For instance, a recent attack
in April 2018, where 3.75 million Social Security numbers and
bank account details were data-mined,128 can lead to public

123. A major new bug was introduced in iOS 12.1 that allowed anyone to
FaceTime groups to listen in on the audio and potentially YouTube video of
anyone else using iOS. It worked ranging from new iPhone XS to iPhone 5S,
as long as it was using iOS 12.1 and above. See Jake Swearingen, Major iPhone
FaceTime Bug Lets You Eavesdrop on Any iPhone User, INTELLIGENCER (Jan.
28, 2019), https://perma.cc/WXT9-5YPT (explaining the details of the
FaceTime bug). Apple anticipated needing a week to fix the bug, advising users
to disable FaceTime on their phones. However, they quickly changed this
policy and disabled group FaceTime from the system level. See Tom Warren,
Apple Disables Group FaceTime Following Major Security Flaw, VERGE (Jan.
29, 2019, 12:04 AM), https://perma.cc/3N2C-PRRX.
124. See Bocetta, supra note 112.
125. See id.; Sarah Kuranda & Reed Albergotti, New Instagram Bug Raises
Security Questions, INFO. (Nov. 16, 2018, 3:32 PM), https://perma.cc/BR3FZLJQ (probing the dangers of Instagram’s recent security flaw).
126. See Bocetta, supra note 112 (“[E]veryday people are giving more data
to companies than ever before, particularly through device or app usage or
through subscription services.”).
127. See EXPERIAN, DATA BREACH RESPONSE GUIDE 4 (2018),
https://perma.cc/K9V5-TZ93 (PDF) (reporting that 46.3 percent of breaches
were through business, 27.1 percent in medical and health care industries,
12.6 percent in banking and credit financial industries, and 6.7 percent in
education).
128. See Rex Hammock, Taskrabbit, IKEA’s Gig-Economy Home Service
Marketplace, Gets Hit by Hackers, SMALLBUSINESS.COM (Apr. 17, 2018),
https://perma.cc/6F5D-QXUP. The attack was made by a botnet that used
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mistrust in the government’s ability to safeguard private data.
While it may be encouraging that it is not a more significant
percentage of identified data breaches, the very governmental
entity responsible for securing people’s data is in reality denying
people of their liberty interest, particularly as it relates to
incarceration. Hackers can develop machine algorithm hacking
methods effortlessly or use botnets to spread an attack.129 The
scope of the impact of hacked AI is unquantifiable.130 Also, every
time a bot system makes an attack, it becomes better when it
attempts to attack again.131
These pale in comparison to the largest cyberattack against
the United States federal agencies that was detected in
December 2020. It is believed that malicious code was snuck into
an update on the software Orion (made by SolarWinds, a
network-monitoring company) in March 2020.132 Several
government organizations, Departments of State, Defense,
Homeland Security, Treasury, and Commerce, and the National
Institutes of Health reported their networks being breached.133
dependent machines (called in the industry “slave machines”) to perform a
DDoS attack on the servers. Bocetta, supra note 112.
129. See Bocetta, supra note 112 (noting the ease with which AI-assisted
attacks and algorithms are created).
130. Consumers who have had personal information exposed through
hacking, theft, or negligence have with increasing frequency brought actions,
often class actions, against the business that held such information in its
computer system. This Article collects and discusses cases that have addressed
the liability of private businesses to governments and consumers for a breach
of data security for consumers’ information when such breach has occurred in
the course of the private business in question. See Eric C. Surette, Annotation,
Liability of Businesses to Governments and Consumers for Breach of Data
Security for Consumers’ Information, 1 A.L.R.7th Art. 2 (2021).
131. See Bocetta, supra note 112.
132. See Kari Paul & Lois Beckett, What We Know—and Still
Don’t — About the Worst-Ever US Government Cyber-Attack, GUARDIAN (Dec.
19, 2020), https://perma.cc/U758-65MX (detailing the malware attack on Orion
that allowed hackers to steal information from several U.S. government
departments).
133. See Ellen Nakashima & Craig Timberg, DHS, State and NIH Join
List of Federal Agencies—Now Five—Hacked in Major Russian
Cyberespionage Campaign, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2020, 10:20 PM),
https://perma.cc/8UDH-NH3J (“The list of victims of the cyberespionage,
which already included the Treasury and Commerce departments, is expected
to grow and to include more federal agencies and numerous private
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The Energy Department and the National Nuclear Security
Administration, responsible for maintaining the United States
nuclear stockpile, reported their business networks being
comprised in the attack.134 Security teams realized that their
initial relief that they had not used the compromised systems
turned to panic when they realized which third-party
applications had also been compromised.135 The attackers used
stealth and several tactics to fly under the radar of detection.
They used United States based internet addresses, timed their
intrusions during working hours, and other careful acts to avoid
raising alarms.136 It is believed that this is the gravest
cyberattack against the United States in years and it can take
months to determine which technology supply chains and
networks were compromised.137

companies . . . .”); David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, More Hacking Attacks
Found as Officials Warn of “Grave Risk” to U.S. Government, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
17, 2020), https://perma.cc/2VY3-GV67 (last updated Jan. 5, 2021) [hereinafter
More Hacking] (noting that the attack appeared to extend “beyond nuclear
laboratories and the Pentagon, Treasury, and Commerce Department
systems”).
134. See More Hacking, supra note 133.
135. See id.
136. See David E. Sanger et al., Billions Spent on U.S. Defenses Failed to
Detect
Giant
Russian
Hack,
N.Y.
TIMES (Dec.
16,
2020),
https://perma.cc/Z2WN-TUF5 (last updated Jan. 2, 2021) [hereinafter
Billions]. The hacked company at the heart of this, SolarWinds, has had
unstable security measures as employees’ passwords were leaked last year.
See Raphael Satter et al., Hackers Used SolarWinds’ Dominance against It in
Sprawling Spy Campaign, REUTERS (Dec. 15, 2020, 8:05 PM),
https://perma.cc/L939-URPC (emphasizing the vulnerability of SolarWinds’
security prior to the attack). SolarWinds’ update server password was
“solarwinds123.” Id.
137. See More Hacking, supra note 133. This will not be limited to only the
United States government as banks and Fortune 500 companies also use the
network management tool from Orion. See Billions, supra note 136. This is not
the first major hack against a United States federal organization. The United
States Office of Personnel Management was hacked in 2014 and
security-clearance files on 22.5 million Americans, and 5.6 million sets of
fingerprints, were taken without detection. See David Alexander, 5.6 Million
Fingerprints Stolen in U.S. Personnel Data Hack: Government, REUTERS (Sept.
23, 2015, 10:50 AM), https://perma.cc/65LH-BP3U; Ellen Nakashima, Hacks
of OPM Databases Compromised 22.1 Million People, Federal Authorities Say,
WASH. POST (July 9, 2015, 7:33 PM), https://perma.cc/9EFT-7UB5 (noting that
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Untrustworthy Data

Attacks on machine-learning is an acute worry of
cybersecurity experts.138 The technology can manufacture
alternative data sets (images, music, speech, and even dialogue)
that can be merged with actual, real-world data in legal systems
with little to no oversight.139 This false data should leave
attorneys, judges, and juries uneasy. Scientists have discussed
adversarial issues in machine-learning,140 but an adversary’s
goals are not always clear. There are three broad attack
categories: quality, confidence, and evasion attacks.141 Quality
attacks are used to drive down the effectiveness of
machine-learning from the training data, to likely convince the
code not to execute an effective analytic or cause it to waste time
trying to improve itself.142 Confidence attacks are used to
decrease the effectiveness, without impacting the accuracy of
the training data.143 Evasion attacks are designed to concoct
specific outcomes for future test samples.144 Machine-learning is
vulnerable to attack because of two necessary assumptions, that
the test data is the same as the training data, and that the
“ground-truth” labels used in the training data are accurate.145
hackers exposed sensitive information of over twenty-two million between two
major breaches of U.S. government databases in 2014).
138. See Harold Kilpatrick, The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence in
Cybersecurity, SECUREAGE (Aug. 24, 2018), https://perma.cc/6WQW-N6TE
(recognizing machine-learning as an area of particular concern in
cybersecurity).
139. See id. (defining machine-learning).
140. See Kegelmeyer, supra note 70, at 12 (citing Amir Globerson & Sam
Roweis, Nightmare at Test Time: Robust Learning by Feature Deletion, ICML
‘06: PROC. 23RD INT’L CONF. ON MACHINE LEARNING 353–60 (2006)) (asserting
that adversarial aspects of machine-learning have been discussed for over a
decade).
141. See id. An “adversary” refers to a malicious entity whose aim is to
prevent the security measure. See Jeremiah Blocki, Adversary Attacks,
CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV. SCH. COMPUT. SCI., https://perma.cc/THB4-KPJH. It
is presented in the idea of a “game” between the user and the system trying to
attack it. See id.
142. See Kegelmeyer, supra note 70, at 12.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 12–13.
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Machine-learning is compromised when the data pool is
poisoned, inserting fraudulent data or code, generating false
positives or false negatives.146 There are adversarial examples
of deep neural networks that can be attacked on pre-existing
audio and visual recognition models.147 Authors Nicolas Carlini
and David Wagner discovered that there was a way that they
could insert adversarial examples into the speech-to-text
systems through slight distortions.148 These authors argue that
targeted adversarial examples exist in the audio domain by
attacking a state-of-the-art speech-to-text transcription neural
network (DeepSpeech).149 To do this, the authors conducted an
experiment where they embedded speech into audio that
typically should not be recognizable as speech.150 By choosing
silence as the “target,” Carlini and Wagner were able to hide
audio from a speech-to-text system.151 With a 100 percent
success rate, Carlini and Wagner were able to turn any audio

146. See Kilpatrick, supra note 138 (listing different malicious uses for
machine-learning).
147. See generally Nicolas Papernot & Patrick McDaniel, Deep k-Nearest
Neighbors: Towards Confident, Interpretable and Robust Deep Learning, PA.
STATE UNIV. DEP’T OF COMPUT. SCI. & ENG’G (Mar. 13, 2018),
https://perma.cc/X4MM-7YXV (PDF) (outlining how the lack of robustness in
adversarial settings leads to complications in the AI predictions). Also,
Mainuddin Ahmad Jonas and David Evans presented how adversarial attacks
on image classifications can be hidden in layers, leading to adversarial attacks.
Mainuddin Ahmad Jonas & David Evans, Poster: Enhancing Adversarial
Example Defenses Using Internal Layers, INST. ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS SYMP.
ON SEC. & PRIV. (2018), https://perma.cc/TR7F-JC7P (PDF) [hereinafter
Enhancing Adversarial Example Defenses].
148. See Chris Edwards, Hidden Messages Fool AI, 62 COMMC’NS ACM 13,
13–14 (Jan. 2019) (citing Nicholas Carlini & David Wagner, Audio Adversarial
Examples: Targeted Attacks on Speech-to-Text, INST. ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS
SYMP. ON SEC. & PRIV. (2018), https://perma.cc/7HK4-5YFB (PDF)) (explaining
Carlini and Wagner’s discovery of how to translate adversarial examples into
speech-to-text systems).
149. See id. (describing Carlini and Wagner’s attack on the DeepSpeech
engine published as open-source code).
150. See id. (“Rather than using noise to confuse the system, [Carlini] had
found the engine was susceptible to slightly modified recordings of normal
speech or music.”).
151. See id.
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waveform into any target transcription.152 The authors also
found that it was possible to hide speech inside audio by adding
adversarial noise to cause the speech-to-text transcription
neural network to transcribe nothing; music can be transcribed
as arbitrary speech, and audio can transcribe up to fifty
characters per second, hiding false data.153
Google scientist, Christian Szegedy, studied deep neural
networks and discovered intrinsic blind spots in the deep neural
networks that were present despite a robust design.154 There
were contradictions in the neural network’s capability to
perform accurately. Despite the neural net’s high ability to
perform and seemingly robust design, it had difficulty
performing when given adversarial examples that had been
generated by another neural network.155
The speech could be hidden so that a deep neural network,
trained through adversarial machine-learning, might convert it
to a false data source, and none would be the wiser. The hack
happening at the creation of training sets that are used to train
the generator and fool the discriminator, could lead to output
data made from hacked means and then wrongly deciding
algorithms. Moreover, these methods of hacks are the types that
are know right now, and do not account for the other methods
that could be in use. The complexity of generative adversarial
networks is that the data breaches happened in such a discreet,
purposeful, undetectable manner that it takes multiple layers of
examination to discover precisely why the attack was initiated,
where the attack occurred, and who perpetrated the attack.
152. See id. (“The attacks buried subtle glitches and clicks in the speech or
music at a level that makes it hard for a human hearing the playback to
detect.”).
153. See id. For more ideas on how these adversarial examples work,
Mainuddin Ahmad Jonas and David Evans outlined how internal layer
information in deep neural networks can help us gain insights into the nature
of adversarial examples, to provide insight into improving defenses. See
Enhancing Adversarial Example Defenses, supra note 147.
154. Christian Szegedy et al., Intriguing Properties of Neural Networks,
INT’L CONF. ON LEARNING REPRESENTATIONS 2 (2014), https://perma.cc/G5XF5SC8 (PDF).
155. See id. (explaining that if one neural net is used to generate a set of
adversarial examples, those examples are challenging for another neural
network to perform).
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3.

Disparate Outcomes

Data is only as good as the people who produce it and the
security that protects it. Bad actors can manufacture results
that do not serve their intended goals or targets but have a
second-order effect156 that will cause others to suffer either as a
result of a backlash or policy shift. This technology is not as
advanced as is purported. In 2018, the Pentagon’s Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) announced a $2
billion commitment to the development of “third-wave” AI tools
that would show reasoning and contextual awareness—common
sense.157 Technology that lacks the common sense of an
eighteen-month-old158 should not determine people’s access to
due process. AI has recently had two very public incidents of
disparate outcomes in the last year. In 2019, Apple Credit
Card’s reliance on their technology led to disparate credit limits
being issued to husbands and wives with the same credit
history, sometimes, with a variable differential of 20:1 limit
compared to the other.159 In the same year, United Health was
156. See RADEK SILHAVY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE METHODS IN
INTELLIGENT ALGORITHMS 302 (2019) (detailing the harmful effects that
information and communications technology can have on the environment).
157. See Mark Jones, DARPA Wants to Give AI Common Sense Using
Child Psychology, TECHHQ (Nov. 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/UM3M-6WCP
(exploring DARPA’s multi-year commitment to developing common sense in
AI).
158. At this time, machine-learning does not have the “common sense” of
an eighteen-month-old human child. See Alison Gopnik, The Ultimate
Learning Machines, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2019, 11:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/VYV5-57N3 (“Babies seem to learn much more general and
powerful kinds of knowledge than AIs do, from much less and much messier
data.”); Jack Corrigan, DARPA Wants to Build Computers with “Common
Sense,” NEXTGOV (Oct. 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/K8PJ-G8E6 (noting that
DARPA will compare AI tools against the cognitive abilities of children ages
zero to eighteen months); Melanie Mitchell, AI Can Pass Standardized Tests—
but It Would Fail Preschool, WIRED (Sept. 10, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/FS5M-F7RT (arguing that DARPA seems “quite far” from
developing an AI system with the common sense of an eighteen-month-old).
159. See Neil Vigdor, Apple Card Investigated after Gender Discrimination
Complaints, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2019), https://perma.cc/SG8L-64MJ (writing
about an upset Twitter user whose Apple Card spending limit was twenty
times higher than his wife’s, despite her higher credit score). Goldman Sachs
said it would reevaluate credit limits on a case-by-case basis. See Kif Leswing,
Goldman Sachs Will Reevaluate Apple Card Credit Limits After Bias
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accused of using an algorithm that led to sicker Black Americans
receiving differential medical treatment than less ill White
persons,160 even though a robust body of law prohibits this type
of unconstitutional outcome.161 These examples show that the
implementation of the technology requires vigilant and constant
oversight before it is allowed to be used on the public.
One of the problems of AI is that false data results and
racist data—implicit and intentional—may also be produced,
leading to disparate outcomes. “Tay” was an AI bot designed and
released by Microsoft Corporation in 2016.162 It was designed to
mirror the language patterns of a nineteen-year-old girl and
programmed to learn all human interactions by interacting with
people via Twitter.163 Within sixteen hours, Tay had to be shut
down due to several racist, anti-Semitic, and sexually charged
messages in response to other Twitter users.164 Microsoft had
not been able to determine if Tay’s racist responses were based
on a “repeat after me” capability (which may or may not be a

Allegations, CNBC (Nov. 11, 2019, 7:26 PM), https://perma.cc/3MZF-KMTP.
Some experts are arguing that the disparate outcomes are not based on the
algorithm coding errors. See, e.g., Diane Harris, Apple Card Gender Bias?
Don’t Assume Its Discrimination, Experts Warn, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 12, 2019,
6:18 AM), https://perma.cc/U49N-P75J (considering various possible causes of
the disparities).
160. Melanie Evans & Anna Wilde Mathews, New York Regulator Probes
UnitedHealth Algorithm for Racial Bias, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2019, 7:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/8MAL-6QSM (“New York’s insurance regulator said it is
launching an investigation into a UnitedHealth Group Inc. algorithm that a
study found prioritized care for healthier white patients over sicker black
patients.”).
161. A letter to UnitedHealth by the Department of Financial Services and
Department of Health outlined that “the N.Y. Insurance Law, N.Y. Human
Rights Law, N.Y. General Business Law, and federal Civil Rights Act [all]
protect against discrimination for certain classes of individuals.” Letter from
Linda Lacewell, Superintendent, N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs. & Howard
Zucker, Comm’r, N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, to David Wichmann, Chief Exec.
Officer, UnitedHealth Grp. Inc. (Oct. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/N3KS-KYFB
(PDF) [hereinafter Letter from Linda Lacewell].
162. See Peter Bright, Tay, the Neo-Nazi Millennial Chatbot, Gets
Autopsied, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 25, 2016, 7:15 PM), https://perma.cc/FR6NJVVU (stating that Microsoft created Tay in 2016 to replicate a similar
Chinese bot).
163. Id.
164. See id. (listing examples of the tweets).
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built-in feature), whether it was a learned response, or if it was
an example of complex behavior that cannot be traced to code.165
Users told Tay that the Holocaust did not occur.166 Tay did not
know what the Holocaust was (only that it was a proper noun),
and since users told Tay it did not happen, Tay then proceeded
to operate and evolve with that base understanding.167
Peter Lee, Microsoft’s corporate vice president of Microsoft
Research, apologized and acknowledged that the testing done
did not accurately prepare for the fact that the public would
actively seek to destabilize and attack the bot.168 Caroline
Sinders, a machine-learning designer and Fellow of the Digital
Harvard Kennedy School, documented concerns about
machine-learning and bots and how they learn.169 She noted
that AI must be trained using a body of data, and this corpus
must be sorted through knowledge trees that direct a question
or type of question to a pre-formed answer.170 However,
Microsoft did not restrict specific pre-imagined queries from
being directed to certain outcomes.171 While they did code for
sensitive topics such as Eric Garner’s murder by law
enforcement, it did not have hard-coded responses to particular
terms such as rape, domestic violence, or Holocaust denials.172
This lack of pre-thought is a fundamental design flaw, as things
like racism, privacy, and danger continue to be embedded in
AI.173 The level of cyberattacks that can happen (not in the
public eye, as with Tay, but deep within the design of the AI) is

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See id. (explaining that Tay was incapable of recognizing why users
would lie to her about the Holocaust).
168. Id.
169. Caroline Sinders, Microsoft’s Tay Is an Example of Bad Design,
MEDIUM (Mar. 24, 2016), https://perma.cc/Y4Y6-X6WX.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Facebook deals with this as it relates to requests to remove false
information from its social media platform. See Working to Stop
Misinformation and False News, FACEBOOK (2017), https://perma.cc/WY3SPHJY (outlining the steps Facebook is taking to combat false news).
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uncertain, and the most concerning emerging issue in
cybersecurity today.174
Additionally, there is growing alarm within the legal
community about the unintended outcomes from relying on AI
created outcomes. For instance, “Poverty Lawgorithms: A
Poverty
Lawyer’s
Guide
to
Fighting
Automated
Decision-Making Harms on Low-Income Communities” is a
guide authored by Michele Gilman that assists lawyers who
advocate for low-socioeconomic clients about the hidden ways AI
has been imbedded in family law, housing, workers’ rights,
immigration surveillance, public benefits, schools and
education, and consumer law.175 These efforts by attorneys176
remind all that the legal community must be vigilant in
reviewing all instances of third-party software and applications
used by United States systems.
D.

Prevention Efforts by Scientists Are Insufficient

Bad data—whether found or created—affects the outputs,
and the AI will learn inaccurate results, producing disastrous
outcomes.177 Software designers are continually working to
ensure efficiency, accuracy, transparency, and accountability.178
It is humorous to read stories of how AI mistakes a cat for

174. See Kegelmeyer, supra note 70, at 14 (acknowledging that adversarial
machine-learning is a new and developing field but contending that the
dangers of cyberattacks require continued use of machine-learning methods).
175. Michele Gilman, Poverty Lawgorithms: A Poverty Lawyer’s Guide to
Fighting Automated Decision-Making Harms on Low-Income Communities,
DATA & SOC’Y (Sept. 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/4H4K-LR9G (PDF).
176. See Karen Hao, The Coming War on the Hidden Algorithms That Trap
People in Poverty, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 4, 2020), https://perma.cc/4ECRQDXB (explaining how attorneys are fighting the automated systems that
deny the poor housing, jobs and basic services).
177. See Thomas C. Redman, If Your Data Is Bad, Your Machine Learning
Tools Are Useless, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/3PHWLAD2 (“The quality demands of machine learning are steep, and bad data can
rear its ugly head twice both in the historical data used to train the predictive
model and in the new data used by that model to make future decisions.”).
178. See Darrell M. West & John R. Allen, How Artificial Intelligence Is
Transforming
the
World,
BROOKINGS INST. (Apr.
24,
2018),
https://perma.cc/J4AC-AESD (showing how software designers can anticipate
problems and analyze specific issues within AI systems).
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guacamole179 or a turtle for a rifle.180 However, the same AI can
make life-threatening mistakes. It can wrongly decide that a
patient does not need medical care based on faulty data sets.181
It can wrongly decide that a wife will be a higher credit risk than
her husband based on faulty data sets.182 It can wrongly
determine that a defendant has a higher likelihood of recidivism
based on faulty data sets.183 Left unsupervised, unregulated AI
directly impacts access to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness,
and fairness in the legal system.184
179. See Jonathan Zittrain, The Hidden Costs of Automated Thinking,
NEW YORKER (July 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/W55L-MZT4 (describing a
machine-learning model that became 99.99 percent sure it was given a
photograph of guacamole, even though the photograph was a cat to human
eyes).
180. See Anish Athalye et al., Synthesizing Robust Adversarial Examples,
PROC. 35TH INT’L CONF. ON MACH. LEARNING (June 7, 2018),
https://perma.cc/N5FQ-PXPG (PDF) (describing a study in which an algorithm
consistently classified poses of a 3D-printed turtle as a rifle); Kim Martineau,
Why Did My Classifier Just Mistake a Turtle for a Rifle?, MIT NEWS (July 31,
2019), https://perma.cc/P4S2-KBP5.
181. United Health was accused of using an algorithm that led to sicker
Black Americans receiving medical treatment less often than less ill White
persons. See Evans & Mathews, supra note 160. “New York’s insurance
regulator said it is launching an investigation into a UnitedHealth Group Inc.
algorithm that a study found prioritized care for healthier white patients over
sicker black patients.” Id.
182. Apple Credit Card led to disparate credit limits being issued to
husbands and wives with the same credit history, sometimes at the magnitude
of a twenty times difference. Vigdor, supra note 159. Goldman Sachs said it
would reevaluate credit limits on a case-by-case basis. See Leswing, supra note
159. Some experts are arguing that the disparate outcomes are not based on
the algorithm coding errors. See Harris, supra note 159.
183. See Cynthia Rudin et al., The Age of Secrecy and Unfairness in
Recidivism Prediction, 2.1 HARV. DATA SCI. REV. 1, 2–4 (2020) (discussing the
lack of transparency and data inconsistencies in predictive modeling in
criminal justice databases).
184. Amazon has created the leading facial recognition software called
“Rekognition,” which Amazon has advertised and promoted to police agencies
for use in criminal investigations. See John Warner, If You’re Worried
Artificial Intelligence Is Coming for You, Read Melanie Mitchell’s New Book,
CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 4, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/8KZZ-L4N9. The
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) investigated and discovered that this
software has been leading to the misidentification of people across the nation,
as the software incorrectly connected New England professional athletes to
mugshot databases. Facial Recognition Technology Falsely Identifies Famous
Athletes, ACLU MASS. (Oct. 21, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://perma.cc/RC77-HJL9.
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Programmers and scientists, and cybersecurity experts are
continually working on methods to protect data and systems.185
Furthermore, scholars are studying how to use AI to defeat
nefarious AI.186 However, AI developers are taught to let
efficiency be a driving force.187 Though efficiency allows for a
smooth system,188 it can flatten human thought, producing what
one expects and wants to see, rather than what should be
produced.189 Unexpectedly, technology has crossed into an area
that coders did not adequately anticipate in the design phase:
the implications of a self-determining code devoid of human,
subconscious norms. As Professor Jon Kleinberg, a computer
scientist from Cornell University, explains:
We have, perhaps, for the first time, built machines we do
not understand. . . . [B]ecause they act like us, it would be
reasonable to imagine that they think like us too. But the reality
is that they do not think like us at all; at some deep level, we

Nearly 17 percent of the athletes were falsely identified, and an independent
computer science expert verified the results. Id. A similar test completed by
the ACLU of California, found the misidentification of twenty-eight sitting
members of Congress with a disproportionate number of the false matches
being people of color. Steven Melendez, Amazon’s Face-Recognition Tool
Falsely Matched California Lawmakers to Mugshots, ACLU Says, FAST CO.
(Aug. 14, 2019), https://perma.cc/U46W-A6BA.
185. For examples, see Bocetta, supra note 112; The Threat of AI-Powered
Cyberattacks Looms Large, AI BUS. (Sept. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/86CL2WKU; Ramsés Gallego, AI and Security: Machine Learning Is a Threat
Detection Game-Changer, TECHBEACON (July 5, 2020), https://perma.cc/XJE8ZG3K.
186. See generally John Leyden, AI-Powered Honeypots: Machine Learning
May Help Improve Intrusion Detection, DAILY SWIG (May 11, 2020),
https://perma.cc/PE22-VWTX.
187. See FOER, supra note 24, at 71 (“When programmers are taught
algorithmic thinking, they are told to venerate efficiency as a paramount
consideration.”).
188. See id.
189. See id. at 70 (arguing that algorithms remove humans from the whole
process of inquiry). “Data, like victims of torture, tell its interrogator what it
wants to hear.” Id. at 71. Technology and culture writer Nicholas Carr stated,
“The more time we spend immersed in digital waters, the shallower our
cognitive capabilities become due to the fact we ceased exercising control over
our attention: ‘The Net is by design an interruption system, a machine geared
for dividing attention.’” SCHWAB, supra note 25, at 101–02 (citing NICHOLAS
CARR, THE SHALLOWS: WHAT THE INTERNET IS DOING TO OUR BRAINS (2011)).
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don’t even really understand how they’re producing the behavior
we observe. This is the essence of their incomprehensibility.190
There are efforts for AI to be more directed in their creation
by expanding the types of networks created or in new fields of
study, as at Stanford191 and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.192
However, scientists understand they are barely at the level
of even knowing that an attack did occur. Cybersecurity has
become less dependable,193 and scientists patch the breaches, as
opposed to fortifying all points of entry for a hack.194 Scholars
examining this work understand there must be a sense of
“watchful paranoia.”195 But, this hacked AI can slip into
technology used in the criminal justice system. Moreover, even
the most expeditious committees in the U.S. House of
Representatives will be alarmingly too late, considering that
this technology is already being used to decide people’s liberty
interests in the criminal justice system.196

190. Jon Klienberg & Sendhil Mullainathan, We Built Them, But We Don’t
Understand Them, EDGE (Jan. 21, 2015), https://perma.cc/MB9W-MCFY.
191. See Ethan Baron, Stanford Unveils New AI Institute, Built to Create
‘A Better Future for All Humanity’, MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 18, 2019, 5:07 PM),
https://perma.cc/CBA7-5R9M (describing a new institute dedicated to using AI
to build the best-possible future).
192. See Terri Park, Advancing Artificial Intelligence Research, MIT NEWS
(Nov. 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/492M-B4HL (discussing a new collaboration
that awards funding to projects that target the advancement of trustworthy
AI, enhancing human cognition in complex environments, and AI for
everyone).
193. See Jack Wallen, 10 Cybersecurity Stories in 2019 That Make Us Feel
Less Secure, TECHREPUBLIC (Dec. 15, 2019, 1:10 PM), https://perma.cc/JDM7K3RF (discussing the memorable security threats in 2019).
194. See id. (explaining that for many threats the initial point of entry
needs serious vetting and security which includes a level of risk many
businesses are not willing to take).
195. Kegelmeyer, supra note 70, at 14.
196. House Resolution 153 was referred to committee on February 27,
2019, to develop guidelines for the ethical development of artificial
intelligence. H.R. Res. 153, 116th Cong. (2019).
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RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
ARE NOT SECURE

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,197 part of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,198 had a seemingly
pure motive: to increase consistency in U.S. federal sentencing
by decreasing recidivism.199 Unfortunately, these reforms were
made in a haphazard method that was not evidence-based nor
vetted against existing data.200 Stopping crime with technology
has become a lucrative industry.201 And since then, courts and
correction departments have been using algorithms to
determine a defendant’s “risk” of not appearing for court
appearances. These algorithms have been used in determining
bail, sentencing, and parole.202 Jurisdictions are beginning to
analyze the code’s efficacy and accuracy. 203

197. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
198. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.).
199. See Charles Summers & Tim Willis, Pretrial Risk Assessment
Research Summary, BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE 1 (Oct. 18, 2010),
https://perma.cc/G6AQ-3RRX (PDF) [hereinafter Pretrial Risk Assessment
Research Summary].
200. Some have studied that arguments made in murder and violent crime
decreases were causally linked to higher mandatory minimums put into effect
in the 1980s. See Doris Layton Mackenzie et al., Sentencing and Corrections
in the 21st Century: Setting the Stage for the Future, NAT. CRIM. JUST.
REFERENCE SERV. (July 2001), https://perma.cc/5SJH-MCUK (PDF).
201. See Griffard, supra note 5, at 48 (noting how predictive policing has
developed into a “multi-million dollar business” (citing Andrew G. Ferguson,
Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1109, 1131–32 (2017)).
202. See Alex Chohlas-Wood, Understanding Risk Assessment Instruments
in Criminal Justice, BROOKINGS INST. (June 19, 2020), https://perma.cc/8CW2PA4F (discussing algorithmic tools designed to predict the risk that the
defendant will fail to appear in court).
203. See Kim Steven Hunt & Robert Dumville, Recidivism Among Federal
Offenders: A Comprehensive Overview, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N (Mar. 2016),
https://perma.cc/QN5M-CLEM (PDF). The federal government acknowledged
it still needed to complete a study on the scores produced by PRAIs. Eric
Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Speech Presented at the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers 57th Annual Meeting and 13th State Criminal
Justice Network Conference, Philadelphia, PA (Aug. 1, 2014).
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The objective of predictive policing tools is to reduce
criminal activity in a community.204 Various tools can outline
where crime has occurred but also predict potential crime.
Pretrial Risk Assessment Instruments (PRAIs) purport to assist
courts in predicting future behavior of defendants related to
recidivism risks and failure to appear at trial; PRAIs are used
in almost every state.205 Over sixty risk-assessment tools are
being used in the criminal justice system, combining variables
such as demographics, family background, and additional
factors related to criminal history and psychological and
sociological considerations.206 Risk-assessment tools generally
outperform expert opinion by about 10 percent207 and are seen
as not substantially distinguishable from the human error rate
of judges and parole boards.208 However, the use of the tool
204. See Tim Lau, Predictive Policing Explained, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(Apr. 1. 2020), https://perma.cc/N6SC-RT72 (stating the predictive policing is
designed to identify where to deploy police or to identify people who are more
likely to commit a crime).
205. See Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System: Risk Assessment
Tools, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., https://perma.cc/RX7W-ZS6S (last updated Feb.
2020).
206. See Alyssa M. Carlson, The Need for Transparency in the Age of
Predictive Sentencing Algorithms, 103 IOWA L. REV. 303, 309 (2017). For a
sampling of state statutes regulating risk assessment instruments in criminal
justice, see IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-1910 (2021); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5120.111 (LexisNexis 2021); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-2 (West 2021); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5120.115 (LexisNexis 2021); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 33.07.020
(2021); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-201 (2021); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.25
(West 2021); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2104 (2021); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/110-6.4 (2021); MD. CODE ANN. MD. RULES 4-216.1 (LexisNexis 2021); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-25 (West 2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-124 (LexisNexis
2021); UTAH CODE JUD. ADMIN. 3-116 (LexisNexis 2021); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 7554C (2021); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5A-5-7 (LexisNexis 2021); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 17-22.5-404 (West 2021); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-45 (2021); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 706-670 (LexisNexis 2021); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-01-04
(West 2021); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 332.21 (West 2021); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 2154.7 (2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-803 (2021).
207. Kia Rahnama, Science and Ethics of Algorithms in the Courtroom, 5
U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 169, 175 (2019) (citing Anna Maria Barry-Jester et
al., The New Science of Sentencing, MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 4, 2015, 7:15
AM), https://perma.cc/Z988-NTHJ).
208. See id. at 175–76 (noting that “the underlying truth [is] that
algorithms will . . . be designed and created by people who inevitably hold
value-laden presumptions and intuitions is in escapable”).
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varies across most of the United States jurisdictions with court
approval.209
The first goal of PRAIs is to ensure that pretrial decisions
are more consistent across jurisdictions.210 There are no
standardized metrics for risk assessments, so defendants are
categorized based on subjective judgments of pretrial officers,
which can result in inconsistent, disparate, and potentially
arbitrary recommendations in contrast to the intent of the Bail
Reform Act of 1984211 and pretrial recommendations from the
American Bar Association,212 the National Association of
Pretrial Services Agencies213 and the National Institute of
Justice.214 The second goal is to maximize the number of
successful pretrial decisions.215 This goal is achieved “by
maximizing the number of defendants who are released before
they are tried, without negatively affecting appearances and
court rates or public safety.”216 The factors that were associated
most with termination for pretrial risk were related to the
nature of the charges pending at the time of the arrest, the
history of criminal arrests and convictions and active
community supervision at the time of the arrest, history of
failure to appear, history of violence, residential stability,
employment civility, community ties, and substance abuse.217
For instance, the PRAI used in New Orleans was based on the
most extensive, most diverse set of pretrial records ever
assembled—750,000 cases from nearly three hundred
209. See State v. Headley, 926 N.W.2d 545, 552–53 (Iowa 2019) (holding
that it was within the discretion of the trial court to consider risk assessment
tools on their face if it was used in a presentence investigation report and its
use did not violate the defendant’s due process rights).
210. See Pretrial Risk Assessment Research Summary, supra note 199, at
1.
211. 18 U.S.C §§ 3141–3156
212. See Pretrial Risk Assessment Research Summary, supra note 199, at
1.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. Id. at 2.
216. Id.
217. See id. (citing Marie VanNostrand & Kenneth J. Rose, Pretrial Risk
Assessment in Virginia, VA. DEP’T CRIM. JUST. SERVS. (May 1, 2009),
https://perma.cc/32R4-FF9R (PDF)).
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jurisdictions.218 Research shows that actuarial risk assessment
instruments can provide some predictive benefits for pretrial
decisions.219 It is noteworthy that although PRAIs state they do
not explicitly rely on factors such as race, ethnicity, or
geography,220 variables such as “risk” can be a proxy for race.221
State legislation related to the regulation of risk
assessment instruments is varied and, in some instances, vague.
States use a variety of terms such as “risk assessment
instruments” (“RAI”) and “risk assessment tools.”222 Very few of
these statutes explicitly state that the instrument they are
using is digital. Some describe it as a “worksheet” while others
simply do not address the question.223 Some states only list
specific departments using their RAI (i.e., juvenile detention,
probation office), while others only list information at a local
district level.224 Two commonly used products are COMPAS and
the Arnold Tool. This section analyzes these two products.

218. Shelbi Flynn et al., Pretrial Risk Assessment: The Use of
Evidence-Based Assessment Tools During Bond Setting, CITY OF NEW ORLEANS,
https://perma.cc/3WCY-ECVS.
219. See Pretrial Risk Assessment Research Summary, supra note 199, at
4.
220. MATTHEW DEMICHELE ET AL., THE INTUITIVE-OVERRIDE MODEL:
NUDGING JUDGES TOWARD PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS 24 (2018),
https://perma.cc/7KET-8854 (PDF).
221. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of
Risk Assessment, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 237, 238 (2015).
222. See John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk
Assessment and the Future of Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725, 1780–81
(2018) (describing nationwide adoption of such tools).
223. See Brian Netter, Using Group Statistics to Sentence Individual
Criminals: An Ethical and Statistical Critique of the Virginia Risk Assessment
Program, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 701 (2007) (explaining that the
Virginia system relies upon “simple worksheets that tally demerits for past
crimes with additional penalties for demographic characteristics found to be
correlated with the commission of crime”). I opted not to include any statutes
that only say something to the effect of “we use an RAI” with no further detail.
Just because a state is not represented does not necessarily mean they are not
using some form of AI.
224. The few statutes that go into detail about their standards require
checking every five years for accuracy. Indiana’s statute notes explicitly that
rules will be adopted for RAI standards “before January 2020.” IND. CODE
§ 35-33-8-0.5 (2021).
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COMPAS is an acronym for Correctional Offender
Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions.225 COMPAS
was developed by Equivant (formerly Northpoint)226 and is used
throughout the United States to determine pretrial detention,
sentencing, or probation and parole.227 The COMPAS scale is an
algorithmically determined assessment that claims to predict an
individual’s risk of recidivism.228 The COMPAS assessment
roughly estimates the risk of recidivism using several variables.
Combining data from interviews with the offender,229
information derived from the offender’s criminal history and
observations of the person,230 and other unknown factors,
COMPAS derives a score to represent a defendant’s likelihood
of recidivism or potential behavior while incarcerated.231
COMPAS provides users with a pretrial release risk scale,232
general recidivism scale,233 and a violent recidivism scale.234
The Arnold Tool is another PRAI that has gained national
attention. The Arnold Tool was created by Arnold Ventures
(formerly The Laura and John Arnold Foundation) and has been
implemented in more than forty jurisdictions.235 The Arnold
Tool is implemented differently depending on the jurisdiction.
For instance, the New Jersey Constitution states that the
Arnold Tool is to calculate the defendant’s dangerousness,
history of failure to appear, and obstruction of the criminal
225. See Ed Yong, A Popular Algorithm Is No Better at Predicting Crimes
than Random People, ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/BD4A-MHP8.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See NORTHPOINTE, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE 27
(2015).
229. For a sample of the COMPAS Risk Assessment questions, see Julia
Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://perma.cc/925Z-W289.
230. Such as criminal involvement, relationships and lifestyle, personality
and attitudes, family, and social exclusion. See Algorithms in the Criminal
Justice System: Risk Assessment Tools, supra note 205, at 26.
231. See NORTHPOINTE, supra note 228, at 27.
232. See id.
233. See id. at 26.
234. See id. at 28.
235. See, e.g., Public Safety Assessment for Pretrial Release and Detention,
N.M. COURTS, https://perma.cc/9ULH-2NTA.
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justice.236 By comparison, New Mexico has a constitutionally
mandated implementation that does not require a calculation of
a defendant’s failure to appear or obstruct justice.237
Jurisdictions also differ in the steps the courts must follow
before rendering a verdict, such as four additional steps in
Arizona, five steps in Santa Cruz County, California, and in
New Jersey, ten additional steps that must be taken.238
Nearly 120 criminal justice organizations have called for a
halt to the use of all PRAIs,239 and district attorney associations
and criminal defense organizations agree that risk assessment
tools are opening unintended consequences that leave
defendants and victims without recourse.240 Civil rights
organizations note six areas of concern regarding the use of
algorithmic decision-making tools: lack of transparency, lack of
accuracy, failure to provide the necessary information, the
perpetuation of racial bias and discrimination, subjective
interpretation by decision-makers, and measurement of group
risk instead of individual risk.241 COMPAS came to the public’s

236. See RAUL TORREZ & DIANNA LUCE, MINORITY REPORT: AD HOC
COMMITTEE TO REVIEW PRETRIAL RELEASE AND DETENTION PROCEDURES 4
(2020), https://perma.cc/FZ4G-YUV9 (PDF) [hereinafter MINORITY REPORT]
(citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-18 (West 2020)).
237. See id. (citing N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13).
238. See id. at 5 (comparing jurisdictions). New Mexico requires no
additional steps. See id. The University of New Mexico Institute for Social
Research published a response to the Minority Report outlining points of
agreement and dissension about the interpretation of the data gathered. UNIV.
N.M., INST. FOR SOC. RSCH., RESPONSE TO THE MINORITY REPORT (2020),
https://perma.cc/7F7Z-V44E.
239. See LEADERSHIP CONF. EDUC. FUND, THE USE OF PRETRIAL “RISK
ASSESSMENT” INSTRUMENTS: A SHARED STATEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS CONCERNS
10, https://perma.cc/WB7C-XH7D (PDF) [hereinafter USE OF PRETRIAL “RISK
ASSESSMENT” INSTRUMENTS] (listing signatory organizations).
240. See Eric W. Siddall, The Real World and the Failure of “Bail
Assessment Tools”, ASS’N OF DEPUTY DIST. ATT’YS, https://perma.cc/K2FWQ58N (“The Arnold tool has led to the massive release of violent criminals and
tragic results.”); MINORITY REPORT, supra note 236, at 3 (noting that 23 percent
of defendants released before trial committed new crimes during the pretrial
period).
241. See USE OF PRETRIAL “RISK ASSESSMENT” INSTRUMENTS, supra note
239, at 2–4 (recommending principles that “provide tools and guidance for
reducing the harm that these assessments can impose”).
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attention because of a prominent ProPublica article242 which
outlined concerning outcomes from the product and a Wisconsin
Supreme Court case, State v. Loomis,243 that also defined glaring
concerns of the product. The ProPublica article noted that
COMPAS performed worse on one measure of performance
(false positive rates) for Black individuals than White
individuals.244 Other researchers counter that the disparity can
be explained by differences in the underlying offense rates for
each race without a biased model.245 However, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in State v. Loomis addressed this issue. Mr.
Loomis wanted clarity and redress due to the proprietary nature
of the software, the inability to identify high-risk persons
because of the way the data is gathered, lack of cross-validation
with the Wisconsin specific population, concerns about
disproportionately classified minority offenders, and that the
software was designed for post-sentencing determinations.246
Scientist Kristin Lum has also discovered concerning outcomes
242. See Angwin et al., supra note 229 (arguing that the risk assessment
tool was unreliable in predicting violent crime and produced racially disparate
risk scores).
243. 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016).
244. See Angwin et al., supra note 229; see also Alex Chohlas-Wood,
Understanding Risk Assessment Instruments in Criminal Justice, BROOKINGS
INST. (June 19, 2020), https://perma.cc/EX3H-WD3D (characterizing the
ProPublica findings as the “most notable claim” of discrimination made
against a risk assessment tool).
245. See id. (citing Sam Corbett-Davies & Sharad Goel, The Measure and
Mismeasure of Fairness: A Critical Review of Fair Machine Learning, CORNELL
UNIV. (Aug. 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/2BTB-4CD7 (PDF)). After applying a
traditional measure of model fairness, researchers noted that evidence of
racial discrimination faded. See Cholas-Wood, supra note 244 (citing Sam
Corbett-Davies et al., A Computer Program Used for Bail and Sentencing
Decisions Was Labeled Biased against Blacks. It’s Actually Not That Clear.,
WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://perma.cc/3KTN-VK3V).
246. See Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 769; Angwin et al., supra note 229
(explaining Loomis’ arguments against the use of COMPAS in his sentencing
decision). For details on how ProPublica analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism
Algorithm, see Jeff Larson et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism
Algorithm, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/S669-RR9N. A group
of Stanford researchers determined it was virtually impossible to create a
predictive model for all races that did not protect disparities in those who
suffer the harm of incorrect predictions, though it has been contested. See
Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 245 (“[T]here is a mathematical limit to how
fair any algorithm—or human decision-maker—can ever be.”).
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from the use of the Arnold Tool. Booking charges that did “not
result in a conviction (i.e., charges that are dropped or end in an
acquittal) increased the recommended level of pretrial
supervision in around 27 percent of cases evaluated by the
tool.”247 Mr. Loomis, the ProPublica article, and Dr. Lum note
that a lack of transparency in the algorithms leaves neither
camp with clarity.248 AI products used in the criminal justice
system are just as vulnerable to attack as other industries.249 As
AI is used in policing, pretrial detention, sentencing, and
probation, these products must increase transparency to ward
against cyberattacks and bias due to various factors.
III. LEGAL OPTIONS FOR PEOPLE HARMED BY UNTRUSTWORTHY
AI IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The Sixth Amendment250 affords defendants the right to
face their accusers and to review the evidence against them.251
247. Kristian Lum et al., The Impact of Overbooking on a Pre-Trial Risk
Assessment Tool, in FAT* ‘20: PROCS. OF THE 2020 CONF. ON FAIRNESS,
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY 482, 482 (2020), https://perma.cc/HD6RX2NP (PDF).
248. See, e.g., Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 757 (noting Mr. Loomis’ assertion
that using the COMPAS risk assessment tool at sentencing “violates a
defendant’s right to be sentenced based upon accurate information, in part
because the proprietary nature of COMPAS prevents him from assessing its
accuracy”).
249. See, e.g., Andy Greenberg, Hack Brief: Anonymous Stole and Leaked
a Megatrove of Police Documents, WIRED (June 22, 2020, 12:48 PM),
https://perma.cc/7TRF-563K (reporting the leak of more than a million files
from more than two hundred state, local, and federal law enforcement
agencies).
250. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
251. Brady v. Maryland provides the United States’ standard of
“discovery” as outlined in the Sixth Amendment; this standard introduces the
production of evidence by the prosecution that would be favorable to the
accused. See 373 U.S. 83, 89–90 (1963); MARK J. MAHONEY, THE RIGHT TO
PRESENT A DEFENSE 12 (1994) (noting that Brady’s discussion of discovery
rights was based in the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment).
Mahoney argues that because of the lack of a common law right to discovery
before trial and restrictions to certain types of materials, discovery practices
in the United States do not reflect all of the ways compulsory process
requirements should be interpreted. MAHONEY, supra, at 14. And in the
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Though the evidence procurement framework is established in
Brady v. Maryland, 252 it does not incorporate the reality of how
AI works. Other paths must be created for recourse. This section
will discuss how data breaches are dealt with in the law, outside
of the criminal justice system, and through case law from
Wisconsin and New Jersey. It also presents potential theories of
liability for wrongfully convicted defendants and third-party
victims based on AI-based software.
A.

Impact of Data Errors Outside of the Criminal Justice
System

In light of the threat landscape and the technology
capabilities, it is vital to think of cybersecurity through statutes
such as the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018253 and the
European Union General Data Protection Regulation of 2016.254
Data protection and privacy law provide an underpinning for
why secured data is so necessary to justice. Since May 2018, the
European Union General Data Protection Regulation (EU
GDPR) has provided data protection and privacy, giving
individuals control over their personal data.255 The EU GDPR
creates a presumption that applying algorithms to personal data
is unlawful, barring certain circumstances.256 This has led to
absence of an express right to discover algorithms, a person must be permitted
a method to confront their accuser, as outlined in the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
252. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
253. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (West 2021).
254. Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and
Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J.
(L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR].
255. See Sahar Bhaimia, The General Data Protection Regulation: The
Next Generation of EU Data Protection, 18 LEGAL INFO. MGMT. 21, 21–22 (2018)
(explaining that the EU GDPR updated existing EU data protection law but
retained its core principles and values).
256. See Andrew Burt & Stuart Shirrell, AI Is Rising, and Governments
Are Starting to React, LAW.COM (Feb. 28, 2018), https://perma.cc/RFR2-8FU9.
The regulation also offers several considerable rights, such as the right to
receive a type of explanation when an algorithm makes a decision that has a
particular kind of impact. See id.
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recourse for harmed individuals. For instance, the French Data
Protection Authority fined Google €50 million ($57 million) for
EU GDPR violations connected to the unauthorized harvesting
and use of personal data.257 Modeled in part on the EU GDPR,
the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), which took effect
in January of 2020, protects California residents regarding their
personal data and its use.258 Both laws provide the right to be
informed, the right of portability, the right to access, and the

257. See Mathieu Rosemain, France Fines Google $57 Million for European
Privacy Rule Breach, REUTERS (Jan. 21, 2019, 11:31 AM),
https://perma.cc/8TYJ-4XJZ (explaining that the EU GDPR gives European
regulators the ability to levy “fines of up to 4 percent of global revenue for
violations”). Microsoft quietly took down their facial recognition data after a
Financial Times report. See Murgia, supra note 81 (citing Madhumita Murgia,
Who’s Using Your Face? The Ugly Truth About Facial Recognition, FIN. TIMES
(Sept. 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/7YJS-5GKE). Technology policy researcher,
Michael Veale suggests Microsoft realized they violated Article 9 of the EU
GDPR. See id. (“There is reason to believe that the people in data set cannot
be considered to expressly and clearly have made their faces public.” (quoting
Michael Veale)).
258. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100. The CCPA is the first comprehensive
data privacy law in the United States. See LAURA JEHL & ALAN FRIEL, CCPA
AND GDPR COMPARISON CHART 1 (2018), https://perma.cc/3DUD-4CN3 (PDF).
It was signed into law on June 28, 2018, taking effect on January 1, 2020. See
id. It is designed to give consumers control over the collection, use, and even
the sale of their personal data. See id. A space of interest to U.S. privacy
advocates is how the CCPA aligns with the EU general data protection
regulation in terms of enforcement and allows consumers to control their
personal information even when held by third parties. Protections related to
the right to notice of data collection, the right to access data collected and
request deletion, and the right to opt out of the sale of personal information,
could potentially fundamentally change the nature of data collection. CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 1798.100(a)–(b), (d), 120(a). As many tech companies are in
California, this can have unusually far-reaching implications. Right now,
these are protections for natural persons who are California residents, but it
will be important to watch if any natural persons outside of California will
attempt to access these protections. See id. § 1798.100(g) (defining
“consumer”). “The Right to be Forgotten” in the EU GDPR and CCPA can
potentially afford individuals a route to private rights of actions. See GDPR,
art. 17 (establishing a “right to erasure”); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105 (providing
consumers with some rights regarding the “deletion of personal information
collected by businesses”). For a comparison of GDPR and CCPA, see JEHL &
FRIEL, supra. Further study of CCPA can provide an additional route for
recourse for wrongfully convicted defendants and third parties, depending on
how the data was gathered.
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right to erasure.259 The EU GDPR creates a “privacy by default”
legal framework, requiring companies to have a legal basis for
processing personal data in the EU, meaning prior consent.260
In contrast, the CCPA creates transparency in California’s data
economy and rights to consumers, providing an opt-out
mechanism.261 This distinction of prior consent, unique to the
EU GDPR, makes the difference, providing a legal strategy for
privacy first through user control and second, by providing a
foundation for examining data and the law.262
Hacked data is an issue that has arisen in several civil
cases. In Beyer v. Symantec Corp.,263 a class action was filed
targeting the cybersecurity firm Symantec Corp. over software
flaws that allegedly rendered consumers’ devices vulnerable to
hackers.264 In another California case, Smith v. Adobe Systems,
Inc.,265 Ms. Smith asserted a claim based on “strict liability
because there were allegedly design defects in Adobe’s products
and services—more specifically, ‘security flaws,’—which
purportedly allowed a computer hacker to ‘hijack control of [her]
browser, files, [and] web content’ and ‘to silently reprogram [her]
hardware [and] user settings.’”266 In National Election Defense
259. See JEHL & FRIEL, supra note 258 (comparing the EU GDPR and
CCPA). Called the “right to erasure” under GDPR, but “right to deletion” under
CCPA. See CCPA vs GDPR: Compliance with Cookiebot, COOKIEBOT,
https://perma.cc/8QTR-ALKA (last updated Nov. 30, 2020) [hereinafter CCPA
vs GDPR] (noting minor differences between these rights).
260. See CCPA vs GDPR, supra note 259.
261. See What Is GDPR?, COOKIEBOT, https://perma.cc/HD8A-8TBV
(detailing the GDPR’s extensive requirements); California Consumer Privacy
Act (CCPA), COOKIEBOT, https://perma.cc/XU74-WGK3 (last updated Nov. 30,
2020) (explaining that consumers can opt out of having their data sold and
request the deletion of collected data). The main rights of both laws are the
right to be informed, the right of portability, and the right to access. See JEHL
& FRIEL, supra note 258, at 3–5 (providing a side-by-side comparison of the
elements of these rights in each jurisdiction). For additional comparisons, see
DATAGUIDANCE & FUTURE OF PRIV. F., COMPARING PRIVACY LAW: GDPR V.
CCPA 26 – 35 (2018), https://perma.cc/JXG3-MPWY (PDF).
262. See CCPA vs GDPR, supra note 259 (noting that the CCPA does not
require prior consent).
263. No. 18-cv-02006, 2019 WL 935135 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2019).
264. Id. at *1.
265. No. C-11-1480, 2011 WL 4404152 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2011).
266. Id. at *1.
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Coalition v. Boockvar,267 the plaintiff alleged that there was a
much-known vulnerability of the voting system, but could not
prove that they were hacked.268 Without defined harm to defined
plaintiffs, there are no legal remedies.269 These plaintiffs could
not recover because they had no way to either access the
algorithms to prove harm had occurred or would occur without
correction. This can lead to years of lost opportunities for
wrongfully convicted defendants and loss of revenues and
resources.270 But, some plaintiffs have found redress.
Flawed AI used by states has amounted to millions of
dollars in lawsuits and fines. The publication, The Markup,
noted that “even an error rate of 1 percent could upend the lives
of hundreds of thousands of people.”271 These instances are

267. No. 674 M.D. 2019 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 24, 2020).
268. Id. In the complaint, the plaintiff stated:
Yet the Commonwealth has chosen to endorse a new voting system,
the ExpressVote XL, which fails at every one of these core functions
and violates the plain requirements set forth in the law to
guarantee them. Moreover, there are continued and credible
complaints that the system is neither secure nor reliable, and is
capable of being hacked.
Brief for Petitioner at 1, Nat’l Election Def. Coal. v. Boockvar, No. 674 M.D.
2019 (Pa. Commw, Ct. Jan. 24, 2020).
269. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (“To
establish Article III standing, an injury must be ‘concrete, particularized, and
actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable
by a favorable ruling.’” (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561
U.S. 139, 149 (2010))).
270. See, e.g., Stephanie Wykstra, Government’s Use of Algorithm Serves
Up False Fraud Charges, UNDARK (June 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/5GVDGSAR (reporting that a Michigan agency falsely charged more than forty
thousand people with unemployment fraud, causing many of them to lose
homes and job opportunities).
271. Lauren Kirchner & Matthew Goldstein, Access Denied: Faulty
Automated Background Checks Freeze Out Renters, MARKUP (May 28, 2020,
5:00 PM), https://perma.cc/G5L8-M3UH.
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occurring in housing,272 privacy,273 and other categories.274 Lack
of government oversight into AI can lead to devastating
outcomes for individuals. For example, from October 2013 to
September 2016, the Michigan Data Automated System falsely
accused thousands of people of committing fraud and took
millions of dollars from them.275 The software, the Michigan
Integrated Data Automated System (“MiDAS”), was supposed to
detect fraud and automatically charge people with
272. Davone Jackson was denied low-income housing because of
misidentification, leading to almost a yearlong of housing insecurity. See id.
(noting that Jackson’s suit was settled for an undisclosed sum). Glen Patrick
Thompson Sr. and his son were left homeless because it connected him to
another person who had been evicted. See id. (noting that Patrick’s suit was
also settled for an undisclosed sum). William Hall Jr. was misidentified as a
sexual offender and could not get approved for a duplex. See id. (noting that
Hall’s suit is pending).
273. See Davey Alba, A.C.L.U. Accuses Clearview AI of Privacy ‘Nightmare
Scenario’, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/BEK2-2ZBZ (last
updated June 3, 2020) (reporting that the ACLU sued Clearview for allegedly
“violat[ing] a state law that forbids companies from using a resident’s
fingerprints or face scans without consent”). The company created a database
of over three billion photos across the internet, including Facebook, YouTube,
Twitter, and Venmo. See id. “Clearview has set out to do what many companies
have intentionally avoided out of ethical concerns: create a mass database of
billions of faceprints of people, including millions of Illinoisans, entirely
unbeknownst to those people, and offer paid access to that database to private
and governmental actors worldwide.” Complaint at 19, ACLU v. Clearview AI,
Inc., No. 9337839 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 28, 2020). Facebook “agreed to pay $550
million to settle a class-action lawsuit over its use of facial recognition
technology in Illinois. . . .” Natasha Singer & Mike Isaac, Facebook to Pay $550
Million to Settle Facial Recognition Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2020),
https://perma.cc/MRJ4-54EN; see also In re Facebook Biometric Info. Priv.
Litig., 326 F.R.D. 535, 540 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (allowing class certification for
privacy action against Facebook).
274. See, e.g., Maddy Varner & Aaron Sankin, Suckers List: How Allstate’s
Secret Auto Insurance Algorithm Squeezes Big Spenders, MARKUP (Feb. 25,
2020, 5:00 PM), https://perma.cc/J2KH-UAKM (finding that Allstate’s new
risk algorithm charged more to customers who were already paying the
highest premiums and “denied meaningful decreases to thousands of Allstate
customers who the company’s new risk profile showed were paying too much”).
275. See Robert N. Charette, Michigan’s MiDAS Unemployment System:
Algorithm Alchemy Created Lead, Not Gold, IEEE SPECTRUM (Jan. 24, 2018,
5:00 PM), https://perma.cc/3YMQ-5PX7 (reporting that the Michigan
Unemployment Insurance Agency collected about $66 million in one year due
to the false charges); Wykstra, supra note 270 (noting that the agency failed
to repay millions of dollars in erroneous charges for years).
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misrepresentation and demand repayment to the state,
garnishing wages.276 After two years of using MiDAS, the agency
charged forty thousand people, billing them at five times the
original benefits at a rate of 400 percent plus interest.277 It was
determined that 93 percent of the charges were erroneous.278
Algorithms in Arkansas and Idaho erroneously cut Medicaid
benefits.279 In 2019, a Dutch court found that an algorithm that
detected welfare fraud violated human rights, ordering the
government to stop using it.280 If a person committed negligence
to this degree, it would be prosecuted as criminal negligence.
However, AI developers are protected by outdated mechanisms.

276. See Wykstra, supra note 270 (“[C]lass actions lawsuits allege that the
system searched unemployment datasets and used flawed assumptions to flag
people for fraud . . . .”).
277. See id.
278. See id. Bauserman v. Unemployment Ins. Agency, No. 333181, 2017
WL 3044120 (Mich. Ct. App. July 18, 2017) and Cahoo v. SAS Analytics Inc.,
912 F.3d 887 (6th Cir. 2019), are two class-action suits brought forward by
people who were impacted by the software in place. The legal director of the
University of Michigan Law School’s Workers’ Rights Clinic testified before
the Michigan Senate Oversight Committee that he believed close to twenty
thousand people were being actively pursued and were having their wages
garnished. See Wykstra, supra note 270 (noting that the director testified in
March 2020); Oversight Committee Hearing, MICH. SENATE (Mar. 10, 2020),
https://perma.cc/JAP3-NBJ3 (providing video of the testimony). It would take
almost six years before some people would have the charges dismissed.
Wykstra, supra note 270.
279. See Colin Lecher, What Happens When an Algorithm Cuts Your
Health Care, VERGE (Mar. 21, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://perma.cc/VJ4F-CUB3
(describing problems resulting from the implementation of algorithms to
allocate home health care hours in Arkansas and Idaho); Michele Gilman, AI
Algorithms Intended to Root Out Welfare Fraud Often End Up Punishing the
Poor Instead, CONVERSATION (Feb. 14, 2020, 8:45 AM), https://perma.cc/KV7CRRRQ (“Program-wide algorithmic errors have . . . plagued Medicare
eligibility determinations in states such as Indiana, Arkansas, Idaho and
Oregon.”).
280. See Jon Henley & Robert Booth, Welfare Surveillance System Violates
Human Rights, Dutch Court Rules, GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2020, 8:18 AM),
https://perma.cc/2HKD-FTQJ (“This is one of the first times a court anywhere
has stopped the use of digital technologies and abundant digital information
by welfare authorities on human rights grounds.” (quoting the UN special
rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights)).
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Nefarious Actors Provide False Scientific Evidence in
Criminal Cases, Infringing on Civil Liberties

Nefarious actors provide false evidence in the criminal
justice system, infringing on constitutional protections. In 2012,
Annie Dookhan was arrested for allegedly faking drug results,
forging documentation, and mixing samples at a state police
lab.281 A recorded 1,140 inmates were convicted based on her
potentially tainted evidence.282 Malicious behavior by
individuals is one morass; but, benign neglect by states
exacerbates the harm. The Public Safety Crime Lab in Houston
promoted Jonathan Salvador despite evidence that his practice
of “dry-labbing” samples (where forensic analysts report results
of tests that they never executed) had put in jeopardy close to
five thousand drug cases.283 This is just as intentionally
281. See CRIMESIDER STAFF, Annie Dookhan, Chemist at Mass. Crime Lab,
Arrested for Allegedly Mishandling Over 60,000 Samples, CBS NEWS (Sept. 28,
2012, 6:45 PM), https://perma.cc/MVH9-RRYU (“[Dookhan] tested more than
60,000 drug samples involving 34,000 defendants during her nine years at the
lab.”).
282. See id. It was initially believed to be ninety samples. Commonwealth
v. Scott, 5 N.E.3d 530, 536 (Mass. 2014). Dookhan provided false scientific
credentials and drew no concerns from her supervisors for years. See
COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., INVESTIGATION OF THE
DRUG LABORATORY AT THE WILLIAM A. HINTON STATE LABORATORY INSTITUTE
113–15 (2012), https://perma.cc/XB9G-YXJ7 (PDF) (“The most glaring factor
that led to the Dookhan crisis was the failure of management.”). She
intentionally turned negative samples into positive and acknowledged she
could not identify which cases were impacted. See Scott, 5 N.E.3d at 536
(describing Dookhan’s admissions to state police). Defendants in cases where
Dookhan served as the primary or secondary chemist were “entitled to a
conclusive presumption that [the chemist’s] misconduct occurred . . . that it
was egregious, and that it was attributable to the Commonwealth.”
Commonwealth v. Gardner, 5 N.E.3d 552, 556–57 (Mass. 2014).
283. See the dissent in State v. Lui, 315 P.3d 493, 521 (Wash. 2014),
outlining several works concerning the laboratory misconduct in Houston. See
also James Pinkerton & Brian Rogers, Crime Lab Analyst Kept on Job Despite
Shoddy Work, HOUS. CHRON. (Apr. 5, 2013, 10:25 PM), https://perma.cc/BX7TPFJD (discussing the retention of a forensic analyst despite high error rate).
Other examples abound. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305,
318–19 (2009) (describing incidents); Thomas J. Lueck, After Falsified Test
Results, Kelly Orders Forensic Shakeup, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2007),
https://perma.cc/BAM7-3NUY (reporting that two police crime lab analysts
falsely reported results of drug tests). In 2013, New York City’s medical
examiner’s office had to review more than eight hundred rape cases where a
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malicious and nefarious as a rogue analyst or department,284 as
it shows a careless attitude towards integrity.
Internationally, countries are already having to backtrack
after software errors led to cases being inappropriately
determined. In 2019, Denmark reviewed over ten thousand
court cases that may have been improperly decided because of a
software bug in a cell phone tracking technology.285 Two
problems occurred in the Denmark situation. One was that
during the conversion process of raw data into evidence, the
system omitted some of the data creating fewer clear images of
where the cell phone had been.286 Second, some of the cell phone
tracking data connected phones to the incorrect cell phone
towers, potentially linking innocent people to crime scenes.287 It
is estimated that these impacted cases go back to 2012; it will
require extensive work to see if any of this data proved to be
decisive in verdicts against defendants.288 There have been
many cases that have been brought by plaintiffs who have
attempted redress through wrongful convictions based on

lab technician had mishandled DNA evidence for over ten years. Mark
Hansen, Crime Labs under the Microscope after a String of Shoddy, Suspect
and Fraudulent Results, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (Sept. 1, 2013, 10:20 AM),
https://perma.cc/F3LH-DNEH. Similar instances in St. Paul, Minnesota, West
Virginia, and Oklahoma City have been documented and many occurred over
an extended period with little to no oversight by leadership. See id. (arguing
for increased regulation of crime labs).
284. After information was unearthed about serious negligence and
misconduct by the ASCLD/LAB in North Carolina, an audit was conducted
that unpacked over 230 cases of “SBI [State Bureau of Investigation] agents
with[holding] exculpatory evidence or distort[ing] evidence . . . over a 16-year
period.” Radley Balko, North Carolina’s Corrupted Crime Lab, REASON FOUND.
(Aug. 23, 2010, 4:30 PM), https://perma.cc/LBT4-LP87; see Craig Jarvis,
Report Criticized SBI Crime Lab’s Lack of Documentation, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Aug. 20, 2016, 3:43 PM), https://perma.cc/W6V3-7FSW (last updated Aug. 21,
2016) (discussing the findings of an independent investigation of the SBI crime
lab). See generally Joseph R. John, ASCLD/LAB Interim Inspection Report,
AM. SOC’Y OF CRIME LAB’Y DIRS. (2010), https://perma.cc/ZM7V-8ASQ (PDF).
285. See Martin Selsoe Sorensen, Flaws in Cellphone Evidence Prompt
Review of 10,000 Verdicts in Denmark, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2019),
https://perma.cc/9542-KQER.
286. See id.
287. See id.
288. See id.
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intentional or negligent handling of evidence.289 If it is already
shown that state contracted labs provided false evidence and
testimony, and it is already clear that technology can be
drastically wrong, there must be recourse available to people
harmed in the United States criminal justice system by
potentially unregulated AI.
C.

Theories of Accountability and Liability from Case Law for
Victims of Potentially Untrustworthy AI Used in Criminal
Cases

This subpart will outline criminal and civil case law where
risk assessment instruments were used. It will also describe
legal theories for accountability and liability for victims of
potentially untrustworthy data used in criminal cases. Potential
plaintiffs must be able to explain the harm caused by likely
hacked and unregulated AI.290
289. See generally, e.g., Creach v. Dookhan, No. 20-10714, 2020 WL
3256890 (D. Mass. June 16, 2020); Penate v. Hanchett, 944 F.3d 358 (1st Cir.
2019); Green v. N.C. State Bureau of Investigation Crime Lab, No. 11-cv-69,
2018 WL 4356778 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 12, 2018); Spencer v. Dookhan, No.
16-cv-12080, 2017 WL 2785423 (D. Mass. June 27, 2017); Spencer v. Dookhan,
No. 13-11431, 2014 WL 6904377 (D. Mass. Dec. 5, 2014); Jones v. Han, 993 F.
Supp. 2d 57 (D. Mass. 2014); Solomon v. Dookhan, No. 13-10208, 2014 WL
317202 (D. Mass. Jan. 7, 2014); Cage v. City of Chicago, 979 F. Supp. 2d 787
(N.D. Ill. 2013); Jimenez v. City of Chicago, 830 F. Supp. 2d 432 (N.D. Ill.
2011); Jimenez v. City of Chicago, 877 F. Supp. 2d 649 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Jimenez
v. City of Chicago., 732 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2013); McCarty v. Gilchrist, 646 F.3d
1281 (10th Cir. 2011); Lincoln v. City of Greenville, No. 4:10-CV-21, 2011 WL
285231 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 25, 2011); Bryson v. Macy, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (W.D.
Okla. 2009); Bryson v. Macy, No. CIV-05-1150, 2009 WL 10672213 (W.D. Okla.
June 17, 2009); Bryson v. City of Okla. City, 627 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2010);
Holmes v. Pierce, No. 04 C 8311, 2009 WL 57460 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 2009);
Holmes v. Hardy, 608 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2010); Washington v. Wilmore, 407
F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2005); Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004); In
re W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 445 S.E.2d 165 (W. Va. 1994);
In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438
S.E.2d 501 (W. Va. 1993).
290. By way of background, Charles H. Moellenberg Jr. et al., addressed
methods for companies to monitor how the legislatures and courts are shaping
tort law to apply to products, components, and software incorporating AI and
ways to use contractual warranties, indemnities, and limitations to control
liability risks. Charles H. Moellenberg, Jr. et al., United States: Mitigating
Product Liability for Artificial Intelligence, MONDAQ (Mar. 22, 2018),
https://perma.cc/XGQ6-8N3A.

702
1.

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 647 (2021)
Legal Response to Data Requests in Criminal and Civil
Cases
a.

State v. Loomis

The risk assessment instrument, COMPAS, was at the
center of the State v. Loomis decision.291 Loomis was barred from
reviewing the algorithms in the software and challenged how
the proprietary algorithm calculated his risk when determining
sentencing.292
In February 2013, Eric Loomis was charged with five
criminal counts related to a drive-by shooting in La Crosse,
Wisconsin.293 He denied being involved in the shooting but did
admit that later that evening, he had driven the same car
involved in the shooting.294 He was arrested and pleaded guilty
to two lesser charges of eluding an officer and no contest to
operating a vehicle without its owner’s consent.295 The judge
sentenced Loomis within the limits of the two charges where he
entered a plea.296 Loomis filed a motion for post-conviction
relief.297 However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that the
use of their risk assessment tool at sentencing did not violate
the defendant’s due process right to be sentenced based on

291. See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 753 (Wis. 2016) (focusing on
whether using COMPAS while sentencing defendants violates their due
process rights).
292. Id. at 761.
293. Id. at 754.
294. Id.
295. Id.; see Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 2, State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d
749 (Wis. 2016) (No. 2015AP157-CR), 2016 WL 485419, at *2 (mentioning that
Loomis pled no contest to two charges, including operating a vehicle without
its owner’s consent).
296. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 756. During intake, the Wisconsin
Department of Corrections interviewed Loomis, gathered information from his
criminal file and entered it into COMPAS. See id. “On the attempting to flee
an officer charge, the circuit court sentenced Loomis to four years, with initial
confinement of two years and extended supervision of two years.” Id. at 756
n.18. “For operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent, the circuit court
sentenced Loomis to seven years, with four years of initial confinement and
three years of extended supervision, to be served consecutively with the prior
sentence.” Id.
297. Id. at 756.
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accurate information, nor did the use of risk assessment tool at
sentencing violate a defendant’s due process right to an
individualized sentence.298 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
noted that the trial court judge said she based her determination
not solely on the COMPAS score but on several additional
factors and noted that risk scores may not be used “to determine
whether an offender is incarcerated” or “to determine the
severity of the sentence.”299 The court did not go to the extent of
saying that COMPAS could not be used but did find that there
should be five written warnings for judges that they are to
review before assessing the pretrial score assigned by COMPAS.
The five warnings were: noting the proprietary nature of the
software, noting the inability to identify high-risk persons
because of the way the data is gathered, noting the lack of
cross-validation with the Wisconsin specific population, noting
the concerns about disproportionately classified minority
offenders, and noting that the software was designed to be used
only for post-sentencing determinations.300

298. Id. at 757, 792. The risk assessment tool’s consideration of
defendant’s gender did not violate defendant’s due process rights. See id. at
766–67.
299. Id. at 769. There is continuing research into what judges explain
about their thought process in how much weight they give to a risk assessment
instrument in deciding their opinion. See Joy Wang, UNM Legal Experts Break
Down Judge’s Decision to Hold Alleged Rapist in Pretrial Detention, KOB4
(Jan. 30, 2020, 1:13 PM), https://perma.cc/W6YU-Y37E (considering a judge’s
use of factors such as severity of a new charge in addition to the algorithm).
300. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 769. The “proprietary nature of COMPAS”
prevents the disclosure of how risk scores are calculated;
1. COMPAS scores are unable to identify specific high-risk individuals because
these scores rely on group data;
2. although COMPAS relies on a national data sample, there has been “no
cross-validation study for a Wisconsin population”;
3. studies “have raised questions about whether [COMPAS scores]
disproportionately classify minority offenders as having a higher risk of
recidivism”; and
4. COMPAS was explicitly developed to assist the Department of Corrections
in making post-sentencing determinations.
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b.

Rodgers v. Laura & John Arnold Foundation

Though errors using the Arnold Tool have occurred,301 to
date there has been only one case of the Arnold Tool potentially
harming a third party not involved in a criminal matter. On
April 5, 2017, Jules Black was arrested by the New Jersey State
Police and charged for being a felon in possession of a firearm.302
The Arnold Tool assigned Black a low Public Safety Assessment
(PSA) score, and he was released without a determination of a
need for bail.303 Three days later, he allegedly killed Christian
Rodgers.304 Rodgers was survived by his mother, June Rodgers,
who brought a suit both individually and on behalf of her son
against the Arnold Foundation.305
This was the first time the Arnold Foundation had been a
named defendant in a tort suit, and it proved challenging to
establish a cause of action. Ms. Rodgers framed the Arnold Tools
algorithm within the product liability failure under the New
Jersey Products Liability Act (PLA),306 focusing on the fact that
the tool was designed in a defective manner.307 The court noted
301. In an additional case, Lamonte Mims allegedly murdered Edward
French two weeks after he was released by a judge who relied on the Arnold
Tool, despite Mr. Mims having been charged with possession of two guns and
being on probation for burglary. Westervelt, supra note 67. The Pretrial
Division Project of San Francisco Sheriff’s Office acknowledged that her staff
mistakenly entered incorrect data for Mr. Mims, leading the product to give
an incorrect score that the judge relied on for making a decision. See id.
302. Rodgers v. Laura & John Arnold Found., No. 17-5556, 2019 WL
2429574, at *1 (D.N.J. June 11, 2019).
303. See id.
304. See id. For more details on Christian Rodgers’ death, see Joe
Hernandez, Mother of Slain N.J. Man Blames Computer Program for His
Shooting, WHYY.ORG (Mar. 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/4Q57-NJTH.
305. See Rodgers, 2019 WL 2429574, at *1. “After the murder, the state
Judiciary updated the algorithm to recommend preventative detention for
anyone charged with serious gun crimes.” Hernandez, supra note 304.
306. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-2 (West 2020).
307. The New Jersey statute states in part, that the product caused a harm
not reasonably fit, suitable or safe for its intended purpose because it:
a. deviated from the design specifications, formulae, or performance
standards of the manufacturer or from otherwise identical units
manufactured to the same manufacturing specifications or
formulae, or
b. failed to contain adequate warnings or instructions, or
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the Restatement (Third) of Torts defined the presentencing
assessment outside the term “product” under the New Jersey
PLA, as the PSA was neither considered a tangible product
distributed commercially for use or consumption nor a
non-tangible “other item.”308 The PSA was seen as “information,
guidance, ideas, and recommendations as to how to consider the
risk a given criminal defendant presents.”309 The court also
noted that under the First Amendment, information and
guidance are not subject to tort liability as they are seen as
speech instead of a product.310 In conclusion, the court also found
a failure to establish proximate causation and the fact that the
PSA omitted risk indicators of firearm possession and
sex-crimes as the PSA is one of many pieces of different
information that a judge takes into account.311
Although in different positions, both Mr. Loomis and Ms.
Rodgers found that their inability to access the algorithm and
data used restricted their opportunities to be heard.312 As Part
II of this paper described how AI is untrustworthy in leading
decisions, there must be ways to protect a plaintiff’s potential
tort remedies when there is no transparency of the algorithm.
Eric Surette outlined in the article, “Liability of Businesses to
Governments and Consumers for Breach of Data Security for

c. was designed in a defective manner.
Rodgers, 2019 WL 2429574, at *2 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-2 (West
2020)).
308. See id. The Restatement (Third) of Torts would consider “non-tangible
items such as ‘other items,’” to include services, human blood, and human
tissues. Id. at *2 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 19 (AM. L. INST. 1998)).
309. Id. at *3.
310. Id.
311. Id. The district court’s opinion was affirmed by Rodgers v. Christie,
795 F. App’x 878 (3d Cir. 2020).
312. See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 760–64 (Wis. 2016) (finding the
claim lacking because neither the inability to challenge “the scientific validity
of the risk assessment” nor the inability to ensure that sentencing is “based on
accurate information” violated due process); Rodgers, 2019 WL 2429574, at
*2–3 (rendering Public Safety Assessments outside the scope of product
liability, making it impossible for plaintiff to bring a claim).
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Consumers’ Information,”313 data breach security concerns,314
and this could provide a roadmap to connect data breaches in
criminal justice software. Once the algorithms in the AI are
made transparent, and if a data breach can be proven, plaintiffs
can begin to prepare plausible causes of action.315
2.

Legal Remedies for Wrongfully Convicted Criminal
Defendants Impacted by Hacked Data

Persons wrongfully convicted based on problematic AI
should be permitted to use legal remedies similar to plaintiffs in
tort cases who have been convicted by falsified data from human
actors. The question is to determine if hacked data may be used
to challenge a conviction or sentence. Cary Coglianese and
David Lehr, in “Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision
Making in the Machine-Learning Era,” provide a strong
rationale for why machine-learning should be used in
administrative agencies.316 First, this is because delegating
decision-making to machines is likely not prohibited by
Coglianese
and
Lehr
support
Congress/statutes.317
machine-learning in administrative agencies because it is
possible to use machine-learning without violating due process
under the Fifth Amendment.318 They also note that
machine-learning within administrative agencies will not be
discriminatory, so long as those implementing it have employed
313. Surette, supra note 130.
314. Id.
315. See id.; In re Zappos.com, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-00325, 2013 WL 4830497
(D. Nev. Sept. 9, 2013) (ordering that plaintiffs had standing for a data breach
claim where they alleged that a data breach occurred and the information to
prove this would be accessible to them).
316. Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative
Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1154
(2017).
317. See id. at 1178–84
A Congress that deliberately contemplated and authorized an
agency to use machine learning would presumably also understand
the need to provide guidance about the necessary objective function
for algorithms to optimize, and it would be more likely than usual
to articulate a sufficiently clear set of goals that would pass the
intelligibility muster.
318. Id. at 1184–91.
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machine-learning in good faith.319 However, hackers do not act
in good faith and are a well-known problem in the tech
community.320
The fact that a harmed person has no evidentiary
mechanisms to question algorithmic accusers violates the intent
of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.321 Adversarial
machine-learning, code that has written itself, modified itself,
and improved itself, with no indication where there might have
been nefarious attacks to the code, withholds from defendants
an opportunity to review the testimonial evidence against the
accused. Andrea Roth has outlined the history of not allowing
machines to testify.322 She warns against the unknown of “black
box dangers” where human error and machine error can cause
a machine to produce faulty outcomes.323 Potentially hacked
data makes machine testimony even more of a necessity.324 The
information needed is withheld because of a protected cloud
server.325 The lack of privity between the harmed party
(wrongfully convicted defendant or a third party) and the
software company allows the state to flee from any

319. Id. at 1191–93.
320. Operating systems and software are full of undisclosed and
undetermined vulnerabilities, whether because of software-hardware
incompatibilities, leaving the products used open to cyberattacks and hacks.
See supra Part I.C; Steve Symanovich, 5 Reasons Why General Software
Updates and Patches Are Important, NORTON (Jan. 7, 2019),
https://perma.cc/XEW7-HJUP.
321. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Professor Roth outlines the history of the
Confrontation Clause and its changing role with the rise of technology. See
Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 2040–41 (2017).
Coglianese observes that machine-learning could violate due process under the
Sixth Amendment’s right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. See
Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 316, at 1184–85.
322. Roth, supra note 321, at 2043.
323. Professor Roth outlines the history of the radar detector. Id. at
2015– 19.
324. See Zittrain, supra note 179 (discussing how AI’s inability to explain
its reasoning makes it so “there’s no easy way to predict how it might fail when
presented with specially crafted or corrupted data”).
325. See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 316, at 1220 (“Agencies must
properly and securely store these data to minimize threats to privacy
intrusions, especially when many administrative applications of machine
learning will require inter-agency sharing through the cloud.”).
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responsibility.326 The federal government, the District of
Columbia, and thirty-five states have compensation statutes for
people who have been wrongfully convicted327 and this must be
expanded to include victims who are wrongfully convicted based
on faulty AI.
Legal solutions using available tort remedies are currently
limited as algorithms are classified as intangible property, like
the information in books or media.328 This property is protected
as trade secrets and confidential information, not products, so it
does not permit persons harmed by AI-based products in the
criminal justice system to access products liability.329 It is also
challenging to access defamation, invasion of property, or breach
of duty because of a lack of privity between the third-party
software company and individuals impacted by the software, as
the privity of contract is between the company and the state
corrections or court system and potent indemnification clauses
shield the company.330
Once the plaintiff can show the AI generated a decision
recommendation based on flawed data or a malfunctioning AI
that violates Equal Protection, the plaintiff can file a cause of
action against the software manufacturer or the state.331

326. See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 760–64 (Wis. 2016)
(outlining why a defendant is unable to see the information contained inside
the algorithm).
327. See Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
https://perma.cc/6DRC-2MKX (PDF). The following fifteen states do not:
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, and Wyoming. See id.
328. See Rodgers v. Laura & John Arnold Found., No. 17-5556, 2019 WL
2429574, at *3 (D.N.J. June 11, 2019) (explaining why no remedy exists in tort
law).
329. See Roth, supra note 321, at 2028 (“Creators of proprietary algorithms
typically argue that the source code is a trade secret or that it is unnecessary
to prepare a defense . . . . But it is not clear that trade secret doctrine would
protect the source code of an algorithm used to convict or impose liability.”).
330. See Moellenberg et al., supra note 290 (recommending such contracts
and indemnity clauses specifically to control the liability risk that comes along
with using AI).
331. See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 316, at 1191–205 (discussing, in
the context of federal agencies, how an AI-generated decision could violate
Equal Protection).
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Scientists have studied the adversarial aspects of
machine-learning for over a decade,332 so any software developer
and customer should be aware of the potential risk in using the
product. Where the flaw occurs should have no bearing on the
plaintiff’s right of recovery, as the software developer sent a
defective product into the industry. If the software company
warned the municipality or court that it could not guarantee
protected data, remedies might be arguably limited. The state
should bear the burden of this error, not a wrongfully convicted
person or wronged third party.333 Additionally, because of the
way AI works,334 it is not reasonable for an indemnification
clause in a contract to shield a company from civil liability, as it
takes time to determine if the software has an error, typically at
the risk of people serving prison sentences.335 Criminal
defendants must be seen as customers of the court, as they, too,
are members of the general public and deserve a route to bring
forth a suit if their constitutional protections have been violated.
Plaintiffs wrongfully convicted under flawed AI should also
be able to access defamation and invasion of privacy causes of
action depending on the extent of the conviction and on whether
the conviction led to the termination of employment, impacted
child custody decisions, or led to the loss of property or standing
in the community. The CCPA permits private civil actions for
332. Kegelmeyer, supra note 70, at 10, 12. See generally Amir Globerson &
Sam Roweis, Nightmare at Test Time: Robust Learning by Feature Deletion, in
ICML 2006: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 23RD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
MACHINE LEARNING 353–60 (2006), https://perma.cc/EJ8D-3CVQ.
333. Many scholars have focused on how companies can protect themselves
from this potential lawsuit through more carefully crafted contracts to shield
them from civil liability whether they design the AI or have incorporated
another product into their own. See generally Emily Garrison et al., Artificial
Intelligence: The New Frontier for Assessing Insurance Coverage,
POLICYHOLDER PERSP. (June 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/TX7B-TLYF; Artificial
Intelligence Liability—Don’t Overlook Your Risk, HUB INT’L (Oct. 11, 2018),
https://perma.cc/9PBE-96C9.
334. The INTRODUCTION discusses the multiple parties involved in a single
artificial intelligence system. See Watson, supra note 29, at 80.
335. Once the AI software is up and running, the developer will insist on
the end-user essentially signing a contract to say the software meets the
specifications set out at the beginning of development. See Michael Carson &
Greg McEwen, Artificial Intelligence Misdiagnosis: Who Is to Blame?, LAW.
MONTHLY, https://perma.cc/E3RM-P7R3 (last updated July 3, 2019).
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data breaches only; these are statutory damages for not less
than $100 to $750 per consumer per incident or actual damages
if the company failed to implement reasonable data security.336
One of the latest examples of a securities class action
lawsuit arising out of a data breach or other cybersecurity and
AI incident, on October 24, 2019, a plaintiff shareholder filed a
securities class action lawsuit against California-based software
company Zendesk after fifteen thousand Zendesk Support and
Chat accounts had been accessed without authorized
permission.337 Additionally, it is not unheard of for civil actions
to be brought forward in this manner. In In re Adobe Systems,
Inc. Privacy Litigation,338 the plaintiffs were customers of a
software retailer whose computer systems were hacked,
resulting in the exposure of the customers’ personal
information.339 The customers alleged that the software retailer
did not maintain “reasonable security practices” to protect
customer data, in violation of California Civil Code Section
1798.81.5(b).340
3.

Legal Remedies for Third Parties Injured Due to Flawed
Data or Algorithms

A victim harmed by a person wrongfully released due to
flawed data in the criminal justice system should also have legal
remedies available, either through the state or the software
336. Kristin Madigan, Data Privacy: California, GDPR, in ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE
AND
ROBOTICS
NATIONAL
INSTITUTE
475
(2020),
https://perma.cc/DYC8-B8ZB (PDF); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.150(a)(1),
(a)(1)(A) (West 2021).
337. See Kevin LaCroix, Zendesk Hit with Data Breach-Related Securities
Suit, D&O DIARY (Oct. 27, 2019), https://perma.cc/3T5V-TA3X; see also Beyer
v. Symantec Corp., No. 18-cv-02006, 2019 WL 935135, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26,
2019) (claiming that Symantec failed to update an open source code “for at
least seven years, resulting in critical vulnerabilities” in the products that
plaintiffs had purchased); Diaz v. Intuit Inc., No. 15-cv-01778, 2017 WL
4355075, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2017) (claiming Intuit knowingly allowed
fraudsters to file returns by maintaining lax security measures); Diaz v. Intuit,
Inc., No. 15-cv-01778, 2018 WL 2215790, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2018)
(same).
338. 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
339. Id. at 1207.
340. Id. at 1210.
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company. One cause of action could be negligence. The first step
would have to assess if the state owed a duty to protect the
victim.341 The standard of reasonable care extends to foreseeable
plaintiffs for foreseeable harm.342 As for foreseeable plaintiffs,
an argument could be made that a person who has been released
from prison could foreseeably harm another. The state and the
software developer should foresee that hacked or hackable AI in
a product used in criminal courts could lead to a dangerous
defendant being released and harm to the general public. This
is what happened to Christian Rodgers when Jules Black was
released and allegedly killed Rodgers.343 However, this is a very
fact-specific analysis. It can be based on biased rationales,
harkening to historical myths of people of color being more likely
to engage in criminal behavior.344
It is foreseeable that software can be hacked. The threat of
hacked AI or insecure data is so concerning to corporations that
there has been a concerted effort to reinforce legal protections
through indemnification clauses between the developer, the
manufacturer, and the customer (the state).345 The question
arises regarding what type of data error (leading to AI error)
would lead to potential liability. If the data is flawed (as in found
data sets), there may be no liability, as this may not be
considered foreseeable within the duty of care, or it may be
considered a causal break in a factual causation analysis, or
could be seen as too far removed in a proximate causation
341. See Dimick v. Hopkinson, 422 P.3d 512, 521 (Wyo. 2018) (“The
elements of negligence are well known: ‘(1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a
duty to conform to a specified standard of care; (2) the defendant breached the
duty of care; (3) the breach proximately caused injury to the plaintiff; and (4)
the injury is compensable by money damages.’” (quoting Brown v. Big Horn
Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 3,388 P.3d 542, 546–47 (Wyo. 2017))).
342. See Johnson v. A/S Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d 334, 351 (1st Cir. 1980)
(labeling an action as negligent where it was foreseeable that an employee
would use the dangerous area in the course of their work).
343. See Rodgers v. Laura & John Arnold Found., No. 17-5556, 2019 WL
2429574, at *4 (D.N.J. June 11, 2019) (noting that Black’s generated Public
Safety Assessment score influenced his release).
344. See generally Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit
Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 292 (2008).
345. See Moellenberg et al., supra note 290 (recommending the use of
“contractual warranties, indemnities, and limitations to control liability risk”).

712

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 647 (2021)

analysis. However, there might be a different analysis to know
if hacked data could create a path to liability.
Another path a plaintiff might pursue is product liability.
Typically, a plaintiff would have access to sue a software
company if the software proved defective.346 However, the courts
and the criminal justice systems are the entities that have
privity of contract.347 There is no privity of contract between the
potential civil plaintiffs who are also the criminal defendants.
Whether products liability claims can be pursued and by whom
will depend on the terms of the contract, which will often provide
indemnification to the software company for logical fallacies in
the code.348 Also, the lack of privity between the software
company and the third party can bar claims.349 While the
software company will have a contract with the court system,
there are often indemnification clauses in the contract that will
protect the software company from any liability that a third
party might face.350 Equity and fairness require that third
parties be able to recover when harmed by hacked algorithms
used in court.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDRESSING UNTRUSTWORTHY AI
Hacking by nefarious actors is a true threat to criminal
justice reform. Without revolutionary efforts, there will be no
justice. Lack of scrutiny will cause further disparities in the
Black community, communities of color, and low-socioeconomic
individuals.351 There must also be hyper-vigilance in monitoring

346. See, e.g., Wendorf v. JLG Indus., Inc., 683 F. Supp. 2d 537, 540 (E.D.
Mich. 2010) (alleging a software defect associated with a machine’s controls).
347. See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 754 (Wis. 2016) (discussing
how a private company designed COMPAS to support the Department of
Corrections, a part of the state, “when making placement decisions, managing
offenders, and planning treatment”).
348. See Moellenberg et al., supra note 290 (arguing for more
indemnification clauses and greater protection for software companies).
349. See, e.g., Flory v. Silvercrest Indus., Inc., 633 P.2d 383, 387 (Ariz.
1981) (holding that lack of privity will preclude recovery in the case of some
warranties).
350. See Moellenberg, supra note 290.
351. See Barry Friedman, Opinion, The Worrisome Future of Policing
Technology, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2018), https://perma.cc/F78C-RUBP
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the creation, distribution, and manipulation of training sets to
guard against cyberattacks. Finally, it is time for
machine-learning algorithms to be redefined as tangible
property so plaintiffs can access product liability causes of action
due to faulty product design.
A.

Hacking Will Have a Disproportionate Impact on Black
Communities in the Criminal Justice System

Black communities are disproportionately represented in
the criminal justice system for reasons that have little to do with
crime. Every jurisdiction is permitted by statute, regulation,
political will, or common practice to maintain records on policing
as they see fit.352 There is no nationwide database on death at
the hands of the police, records of arrests, detention, length of
detention, plea bargains, sentencing, incarceration lengths, or
the demographics of any of the deceased, defendants, or
victims.353 At best, studies rely on estimates, and those numbers
paint a grim picture.354 The Bureau of Justice Statistics found
that from June 2015 through March 2016, on average, there was
an arrest-related death rate of four-per-day (the 1,348 deaths
BJS acknowledged did not include the deaths under federal or
tribal law enforcement).355 The number of Black people harmed
by manipulated algorithms will dwarf all historical records, and
the gravity of harm is incomprehensible.

(“Whether written by humans or a product of machine learning, algorithms
take past facts and magnify them into future police actions. Much of street
policing in recent years . . . has been deployed disproportionately against
minorities and in poor neighborhoods.”).
352. See, e.g., National Use-of-Force Data Collection, FED. BUREAU
INVESTIGATION, https://perma.cc/7WJK-KMX4 (explaining that participation
in this collection of use of force data is open to any jurisdiction but still
voluntary).
353. Rob Picheta & Henrik Pettersson, American Police Shoot, Kill and
Imprison More People than Other Developed Countries. Here’s the Data, CNN
(June 8, 2020, 7:13 AM), https://perma.cc/7MV6-9QPU.
354. See id. (“If every US state were counted as a country, the 31 countries
with the highest incarceration rates in the world would all be US states,
according to the Prison Policy Initiative.”).
355. See id.
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Charlon McIlwain, author of Black Software: The Internet
& Racial Justice, From the AfroNet to Black Lives Matter,356 tells
the story of three civil rights-era leaders.357 Those leaders
foresaw the complexities of race, racism, and technology.358
McIlwain describes how A. Philip Randolph (“the philosopher”),
Bayard Rustin (“the planner”), and Roy Wilkins (“the visionary”)
traced how computing and automation could handily further
mask inequalities with shallow capitulation by the people.359
These men saw the future. Race, racial intent, and racial
disparities are so rooted in the code, so pervasive, and so fraught
with foregone conclusions, that it is poor design not to have
unpacked the racialized exacerbation that occurs from code
design.360 A model following a “burden-shifting test” can help
mitigate the harms.361
Questions to be raised are several: “Is the model fair? Does
the model have a valid business justification? Are there
alternative models that are fairer, but maintain reasonable
predictive ability?”362 Intentional design will help stop further
disparities.
356. CHARLTON MCILWAIN, BLACK SOFTWARE: THE INTERNET & RACIAL
JUSTICE, FROM THE AFRONET TO BLACK LIVES MATTER (2019).
357. Charlton McIlwain, The Three Civil Rights-Era Leaders Who Warned
of Computers and Racism, SLATE (Jan. 30, 2020, 5:50 AM),
https://perma.cc/D3ZY-NGXL.
358. See generally id.
359. Dr. McIlwain calls A. Phillip Randolph the chief ethicist who believed
public interest should direct technological creation, Bayard Rustin, the social
engineer, who outlined technological governance and a need for the people to
be trained for employment, and Roy Wilkins, the visionary, who foresaw a
future where computers would be trained to catalog racist ideologies. Id.
360. “Algorithms don’t have to look at race to be racist.” Friedman, supra
note 351. PredPol, another algorithm was without a way to correct racial bias,
leading to data that did no more than intensify bias. See Griffard, supra note
5, at 51 (citing Kristian Lum & William Isaac, To Predict and Serve?, 13
SIGNIFICANCE 16–17 (2016)).
361. See Nicholas Schmidt, Ethical Algorithms & How Attorneys Can Save
Us from Biased AI, CONSILIENCEML (Feb. 19, 2020), https://perma.cc/VP4PXN5U (PDF).
362. Id.; see Nicholas Schmidt, Ethical Algorithms: Fixing Discriminatory
Machine Learning and Biased AI, in MASTERCLASS: UNDERSTANDING MACHINE
LEARNING 62, 72 (2020), https://perma.cc/RAW6-S7TD (PDF); Lum, supra note
247, at 8 (“[A] pretrial risk assessment instrument must be developed with
community input, revalidated regularly by independent data scientists with
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Appreciating that the machines are designed to replicate
human behaviors reminds us that the biases in human nature
are embedded in the algorithms. It is also foreseeable to
anticipate that nefarious actors will use adversarial
machine-learning to entwine falsehoods into actual data and
outputs. The New York Police Department uses software it
expects to produce models that obfuscate race and gender data
and other potential proxies for sensitive data.363 However, even
this product has raised serious civil rights and civil liberties
issues because of how the software can exacerbate disparities.364
If a designer can create AI, then a designer can create fair
AI.365 Teaching and developing an explicitly anti-racist code of
conduct for AI designers that also monitors for anti-Blackness
in the code will provide a start to addressing the issue of
hacking. The first complexity is defining fairness. Lack of
conditional parity across the entire group defines discrimination
in the code, and machine-learning experts and practitioners
must continue to implement fairness in the code and during
quality control checks.366 “Explainable AI,” designed in the last
five years, gives a model for making the software transparent.367
Understanding the reasons hackers attack systems will help

that input in mind, and subjected to regular, meaningful oversight by the
community.”).
363. See Griffard, supra note 5, at 45 (“‘Patternizr is a new, effective, and
fair recommendation engine . . . [that] when used properly, encourage[s]
precision policing approaches instead of widespread, heavy-handed
enforcement techniques.’”).
364. See id. (“[C]onsider whether the developers’ goal to build a bias-free
predictive policing tool is actually achievable given the limitations of its
inputs—racially-biased historic criminal justice data—and its users humans
with the potential for errors and cognitive biases.”). For additional ideas, see
generally Nicole Turner Lee et al., The Role of AI in the Criminal Justice
System (Living with AI: The Human Impacts of AI Symposium, June 11, 2020),
https://perma.cc/DAK5-9G6T [hereinafter Role of AI in the Criminal Justice
System].
365. See Henk Griffioen, Fairness in Machine Learning with PyTorch, GO
DATA DRIVEN (May 22, 2018), https://perma.cc/3J6Y-BGPY.
366. See id.
367. See Schmidt, supra note 362; Richard Tomsett, Explainable AI (XAI),
in MASTERCLASS: UNDERSTANDING MACHINE LEARNING 33–61 (2020),
https://perma.cc/RAW6-S7TD (PDF).
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train developers to create ways to combat criminal justice
algorithm assaults better.
B.

There Must Be Stronger Oversight of AI Used in Criminal
Justice

Regulation ensures that the use, distribution, and adoption
of innovative technologies are serving society’s best interests.368
Security and privacy of the internet network, data rights, and
protection must be carefully monitored. Data gathering has
been used as a tool to disempower people.369 As users will be
profiled, analyzed, and considered a quantifiable output before
they can act, processes must ensure that an algorithmic
proposed output is not considered determinative.370 Scientists
have also determined that algorithms that are more transparent
and straightforward perform with the same accuracy as the
COMPAS algorithm.371 If there are higher accuracy and
368. See Schwab, supra note 25, at 69–78. It is even anticipated that
something as routine as census gathering can be accomplished through Big
Data sources. Id. at 144. Schwab outlines the governance principles that
should be followed during an era of market disruption. Though security and
privacy are listed, they serve as the foundation as none of the disruption can
be considered forward-moving if it is not correct, transparent, and accountable.
Id. at 72.
369. See Tim Elfrink, Once-Secret Files from Gerrymandering Strategist
Show GOP Misled Court, Watchdog Group Claims, WASH. POST (June 7, 2019,
5:01 AM), https://perma.cc/B7XU-55MU (discussing the impact of racial data
on gerrymandering).
370. The question has been asked, “How do we maintain our individuality,
the source of our diversity and democracy, in the digital age?” Schwab, supra
note 25, at 100. This question is being unpacked by philosophers, attorneys,
theologians, and coders across the world.
371. See Yong, supra note 225 (“[T]his training-wheels algorithm could
perform just as well as COMPAS, with an accuracy of 67 percent, even when
using just two pieces of data—a defendant’s age, and their number of previous
convictions.”). However, transparent algorithms may not lead to an
explanation that will assist a plaintiff in court. See generally Lilian Edwards
& Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to an Explanation’ Is
Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking for, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18
(2018); Elaine Angelino et al., Learning Certifiably Optimal Rule Lists for
Categorical
Data,
J. MACH. LEARNING RSCH. 18(234) (2018),
https://perma.cc/WHN5-3XK7; Robin A. Smith, Opening the Lid on Criminal
Sentencing Software, DUKE TODAY (July 19, 2017), https://perma.cc/MX4ZV6NE.
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transparent products available, they should be used. Scientists,
states, and Congress will then have a better model to follow in
creating new tech.
Companies must produce a framework for every stage in
this process to ensure accountability, including audits, and
impact statements. Scientists and developers must continue to
train datasets to measure intended variables, quantify and
mitigate bias in statistical models, and not conflate multiple
distinct predictions.372 Social scientists and lawyers must be
incorporated in the software design process to ensure public
policy goals are reflected in the tools and are reproducible for
court challenges.373 There can be the creation of source code on
designed
using
adversarial
places
like
GitHub,374
machine-learning to check for equal protection violations in
code. For example, Bnh.ai, a law firm dedicated to legal issues
related to AI and analytics,375 has outlined ten questions an
organization should answer in gauging liability related to the
use of AI.376 Questions such as “how are your organization’s
models audited for security or privacy vulnerabilities” and “does
your company have response plans in place to address AI/ML
incidents” of attacks or failures, can guide government systems
that decide what types of AI to use.377 It can also help map
whether they have correctly and thoroughly thought through all
implications of deploying the software.378
Every state and jurisdiction must do a complete and
thorough inventory of algorithms that are in use in their
372. See PARTNERSHIP ON AI, REPORT ON ALGORITHMIC RISK ASSESSMENT
TOOLS IN THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 16, 18, 22 (2019),
https://perma.cc/C9K3-FR56 (PDF).
373. See Role of AI in the Criminal Justice System, supra note 364;
PARTNERSHIP ON AI, supra note 372, at 27–28, 30.
374. See Georgios Gousios et al., Lean GHTorrent: GitHub Data on
Demand, MSR 2014: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH WORKING CONFERENCE ON
MINING SOFTWARE REPOSITORIES 384 (2014), https://perma.cc/HH8X-GZSZ
(PDF).
375. Seth Colander, Bnh.ai Is a New Law Firm Focused Only on AI,
VENTURE BEAT (Mar. 19, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://perma.cc/KR7C-VJK7.
376. BNH.AI, TEN QUESTIONS ON AI RISK, https://perma.cc/Q2MJ-5Y2J
(PDF).
377. Id.
378. Id.
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criminal justice system, cataloging companies, software, and
data sources. If a state does not make its algorithms
transparent, it must monitor and process PRAIs used. States
should ensure that found data is accurate, show due diligence in
reviewing the data, see if created data has been manipulated,
and provide the public with a clear understanding of the limits
of the technology, beyond even the five warnings presented in
Loomis. AI developers, states, corrections departments, and
judges should query software and algorithms used in the
criminal system, principally looking for the ways AI perpetuates
bias, the properties of algorithms necessary to mitigate AI bias,
and the five places to review for bias in the algorithmic guideline
process.379 If it is evident that AI outcomes further exacerbate
racial disparities, it must immediately be removed from the
decision-making process by law enforcement, district attorneys,
judges, and parole boards.
Federal studies and reform efforts must be unrestrained
and directed towards genuine reform. Congressional AI studies
must be completed with the input of privacy advocates, scholars,
and scientists to counter the outsized influence of tech
lobbyists.380 According to quarterly reports filed with Congress,
Carnegie Mellon University was the only organization to
379. They must know who collects the data, how the algorithm is trained,
how it works, how it will be used, how it will be used to understand the
feedback loop and how new outcomes influence the next phase of the software.
See generally Steven D. Pearson et al., Is Consensus Reproducible? A Study of
an Algorithmic Guidelines Development Process, 33 MED. CARE 643 (1995).
380. See Growing Artificial Intelligence Through Research Act, H.R. 2202,
116th Cong. (2019) (“[R]equir[ing] certain federal activities related to artificial
intelligence, including implementation by the President of a National Artificial
Intelligence Initiative.”); Countering Online Harms Act, H.R. 6937, 116th
Cong. (2019) (requiring the Federal Trade Commission to conduct a study on
artificial intelligence, and other purposes); GAINS Act, H.R. 6950, 116th Cong.
(2019) (requiring the Secretary of Commerce and the Federal Trade
Commission to conduct a study on artificial intelligence, and other purposes);
AI JOBS Act of 2019, H.R. 827, 116th Cong. (2019) (promoting a 21st-century
artificial intelligence workforce); Financial Transparency Act of 2019, H.R.
4476, 116th Cong. (2019) (“[R]equir[ing] federal financial regulatory agencies
to adopt specified data standards with respect to format, searchability, and
transparency.”); see also David McCabe, How Tech’s Lobbyists Are Using the
Pandemic to Make Gains, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/YZ3QUXR4 (discussing the tech industry’s efforts to lobby the federal government
to adopt more cloud-based services).
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disclose “artificial intelligence” as a federal lobbying issue in
2015.381 Product liability and other liability issues will soon be
subject to more lawsuits, and there should be a federal answer
to protect people harmed by AI.382 On November 17, 2020, the
U.S. Office of Management released its final guidance on the
regulation of AI, following a February 2019 executive order.383
Executive Order 13859, “Maintaining American Leadership in
Artificial Intelligence,”384 provides a risk-based approach that
prioritizes stronger protections for AI systems that show a
potential for higher risk with a focus on economic growth, but is
seen as not balanced with an understanding of AI harms.385 The
White House AI Regulatory guidance recognizes a distinction
between private sector AI regulation and governments
deploying AI systems,386 but without a clear acknowledgement
that private sector third-party software used in government
381. Gopal Ratnam & Kate Ackley, Artificial Intelligence Is Coming. Will
Congress Be Ready?, ROLL CALL (June 10, 2019, 7:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/8NWK-VHHE.
382. See id. (“[O]paque automated advertising systems driven by
algorithms
could
perpetuate
discrimination
and
avoid
scrutiny . . . . Tech-savvy lawmakers say Congress must be better educated
before passing legislation addressing artificial intelligence to avoid repeating
the failures made with earlier internet technologies.”); Chris Opfer, AI Hiring
Could Mean Robot Discrimination Will Head to Courts, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov.
12, 2019, 6:01 AM), https://perma.cc/XU88-3DKZ (“The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission is already investigating at least two cases involving
claims that algorithms unlawfully excluded certain groups of workers during
the recruitment process, and seven attorneys told Bloomberg Law it’s just a
matter of time until courts are asked to weigh in on similar arguments.”).
383. See Alex Engler, New White House Guidance Downplays Important
AI Harms, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/44GL-58W8
(citing Exec. Order No. 13,859, 84 Fed. Reg. 3967 (Feb. 11, 2019)). This
executive order directed the federal government to develop five branches for
furthering AI: “(1) invest in AI research and development (R&D), (2) unleash
AI resources, (3) remove barriers to AI innovation, (4) train an AI-ready
workforce, and (5) promote an international environment that is supportive of
American AI innovation and its responsible use.” Artificial Intelligence for the
American People, WHITE HOUSE, https://perma.cc/MV2V-5CVJ.
384. Russel Vought, Guidance for Regulation of Artificial Intelligence
Applications, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/84WQ-JHNJ.
385. See Engler, supra note 383 (“[T]here is a real risk that this document
becomes a force for maintaining the status quo, as opposed to addressing
serious AI harms.”).
386. Id.
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systems is happening, this will not achieve the effect of proper
regulation. Additionally, the guidance states “Agencies should
consider new regulation only . . . in light of the foregoing
section . . . that Federal Regulation is necessary.”387 Engler
notes that without modernized enforcement processes, the
current system allows mechanisms to circumvent the law using
algorithms.388 This was attempted recently by Housing and
Urban Development when it attempted to implement a new rule
that made it impossible for a plaintiff to prove they were
discriminated against by an algorithm.389 It is unknown what
will change with the Biden administration’s policies on AI.390

387. See id. (quoting VOUGHT, supra note 384, at 2).
388. Id.
389. See Elizabeth Fernandez, Will Machine Learning Algorithms Erase
the Progress of the Fair Housing Act?, FORBES (Nov. 17, 2019),
https://perma.cc/YBX7-9B2Z (“[T]he proposal drastically limits the recourse of
those who feel that they have been discriminated against—so much so that it
may be impossible to show discrimination existed.”). The Interdisciplinary
Working Group on Algorithmic Justice—a group of ten computer scientists,
legal scholars, and social scientists from the Santa Fe Institute and the
University of New Mexico—submitted a formal response to this proposal that
articulated how algorithms in housing applications may be inherently biased
against certain groups of people. Letter from Sonia Gipson Rankin et al., The
Interdisciplinary Working Grp. on Algorithmic Just., to Off. of the Gen.
Couns., Rules Docket Clerk, Dep’t of Hous. and Urb. Dev. (Oct. 18, 2019),
https://perma.cc/EH7Q-PBD3 (PDF). On October 25, 2020, the United States
District Court of Massachusetts issued a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of the proposed HUD rule. Memorandum and Order Regarding
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction Under 5 U.S.C. § 705 to Postpone
the Effective Date of HUD’S Unlawful New Rule, Mass. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., (No. 20-11765) (D. Mass. Oct. 25, 2020), 2020 WL
6390143.
390. See Engler, supra note 383 (“It is hard to imagine that changing this
guidance is going to be a leading priority of the Biden White House, given all
its other pressing problems.”). The National Security Commission on Artificial
Intelligence—which includes executives from Microsoft, Amazon Web, and
Google—submitted a 756-page report to President Biden and Congress laying
out their vision for “winning the AI era.” NAT’L SEC. COMM’N ON ARTIFICIAL
INTEL., FINAL REPORT (2021), https://perma.cc/7GSU-Y3T2 (PDF).

TECHNOLOGICAL TETHEREDS
C.

721

Legal Remedies Are Needed for Parties Harmed by Data
Hacks in Criminal Justice Risk Assessment Instruments

The use of AI through criminal justice risk assessment
instruments cements harm to defendants, victims, and stifles
the administration of justice. What Apple and United Health did
by failing to protect women and Black Americans is already
contrary to established Equal Protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment.391 These constitutional violations beg the question:
why did the algorithm not scan for violations against protected
classes when deployed? And if a judge consults a risk
assessment instrument and the tool is also violating the Equal
Protection, the decision must be allowed review.
Tort remedies also provide the traditional means of shifting
all or part of the economic and non-economic loss from one entity
to another due to harm caused by misconduct, deliberately or
through inattention.392 The functions and goals of negligence
law are to deter unsafe activities, compensate injured victims,
encourage economic growth and progress, and improve
effectiveness, efficiency in legal administration, and fairness.393
Scholars have noted the limitations because the limits of tort
law remain undefined, and potentially hacked criminal justice
data is a legitimate concern every plaintiff should raise. In
Bauserman v. Unemployment Insurance Agency,394 the court
noted that the case was remanded so that a cognizable
constitutional tort claim could be identified.395 Resident Fellow

391. The superintendent of the New York Department of Financial
Services, Linda Lacewell said, “Any algorithm, that intentionally or not results
in discriminatory treatment of women or any other protected class of people
violates New York law.” Sridhar Natarajan & Shahien Nasiripour, Viral Tweet
About Apple Card Leads to Goldman Sachs Probe, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Nov. 9,
2019), https://perma.cc/53TS-B6E2. A letter to UnitedHealth by the
Department of Financial Services and Department of Health outlined that
“New York Insurance Law, the New York Human Rights Law, the New York
General Business Law, and the federal Civil Rights Act all protect against
discrimination for protected classes of individuals.” Letter from Linda
Lacewell, supra note 161.
392. See DOMINICK VETRI ET AL., TORT LAW AND PRACTICE 4 (2020).
393. See id. at 13.
394. 950 N.W.2d 446 (Mich. Ct. App. 2019).
395. Id.
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of Yale’s Information Society Project, Anat Lior, author of the
article, AI Entities as AI Agents: Artificial Intelligence Liability
and the AI Respondeat Superior Analogy,396 advocates for the
adoption and application of a strict liability regime on current
and future AI accidents, by delving into and exploring the realm
of legal analogies in the AI context, thereby promoting the
agency analogy, and subsequently, the respondeat superior
doctrine.397 And in The AI Accident Network: Artificial
Intelligence Liability Meets Network Theory,398 Lior argues for a
way to integrate network theory into the field of AI tort law
presenting a new methodology about the appropriate liability
regime that should apply when AI causes damages.399 In Civil
Liability for Artificial Intelligence: What Should its Basis Be?,400
scholar Jean-Sébastien Borghetti outlines that AI used in
different fields can be addressed through particular liability
regimes, whether strict liability or general liability.401 To protect
liberty and fairness, the definition of product liability must
identify AI and algorithms as falling within the definition of a
396. Anat Lior, AI Entities as AI Agents: Artificial Intelligence Liability
and the AI Respondeat Superior Analogy, 46 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 1043,
1043 (2020)
This article explains why the agency analogy is the best-suited one
in contrast to other analogies that have been suggested in the
context of AI liability (e.g., products, animals, electronic persons,
and even slaves). As a result, the intuitive application of the
respondeat superior doctrine provides the AI industry with a
much-needed underlying liability regime that will enable it to
continue to evolve in the years to come, and its victim to receive
remedy once accidents occur.
397. Id.
398. Anat Lior, The AI Accident Network: Artificial Intelligence Liability
Meets Network Theory, 95 TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
399. Id.
400. Jean-Sébastien Borghetti, Civil Liability for Artificial Intelligence:
What Should Its Basis Be?, 17 LA REVUE DES JURISTES DE SCIENCES PO 94
(2019).
401. Id. The harm caused by autonomous vehicles, for example, is probably
better addressed through strict liability regimes for traffic accidents through
a general liability for the AI regime. See Charikleia Bertsia, Legal Liability of
Artificial Intelligence-Driven Systems (AI), INT’L HELLENIC UNIV. (2019),
https://perma.cc/KE59-2U5U (PDF) (analyzing the Product Liability regime in
the European Union to determine whether it suitably addresses issues raised
by increasing AI usage).
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product and not just the final software. The Third Restatement
of Torts must also define AI and machine-learning algorithms
as a product. As it took time to define harm by any product,
harm by hacking and cybercrimes, though complex, must be
given space for redress by victims. These steps can provide
wrongly convicted persons and other victims recourse under the
law.
CONCLUSION
If there is oversight, AI can increase fairness in the criminal
justice system. Else, failure to ensure the validity of AI-based
products will lead to extinguishing liberty interests enshrined
in the Constitution. United States Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., set the nation on course with his
understanding of this principle, in his oft-cited observation:
“The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.”402
AI is how we will rewrite society’s rules, and how we will
explain, defend, and refine the Constitution. It is time for the
law to be forward-thinking in protecting people from potential
harms of AI, whether it has been weaponized or has entered the
public sphere without proper scrutiny. Achieving fairness is a
lofty and necessary goal, but cementing disparate outcomes will
decelerate justice’s evolution.
Ernest Rutherford, the “father of nuclear physics,” said,
“[y]ou should never bet against anything in science at odds of
more than about 10-12 to 1 against.”403 Most Americans support
policies that restrict the scope of autonomous technologies. Yet
society is beyond this moment and cannot, nor should it, go
backward. One day, AI will mimic only the most optimal
principles and protocols of human nature. It will show that
humans strive to be filled with compassion, justice, and fairness.
It will not show greed and bias, nor will it exacerbate superficial

402. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). “The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share
with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in
determining the rules by which men should be governed.” Id.
403. RICHARD J. LIPTON, THE P=NP QUESTION AND GÖDEL’S LOST LETTER,
viii (2010).
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or historical errors and harms. This aim propels researchers
forward to augment human decision points with AI. There is a
need for the systems to protect privacy, offer transparency, and
purposely require software developers and states that use this
technology to ensure it is serving the public. These public policy
concerns will rebut many established torts, contracts, and
patent laws and principles. The technology illuminates flaws
and inequities that have always been in the system. Because of
the exponential speed of technology, legal systems have not kept
up with the rate of change. New principles must ensure at a
minimum that there are no further inequities created in the
system. Social justice must ensure that rational thought is not
being manipulated to perform as the machine would.404 If not
careful, mindful, and vigilant, history will find humankind
responding as an algorithm would rather than ensuring the
human spirit and capacity to improve is captured in the
technology. 405 Now is the time to use AI to devise a society
without the historic human errors of bias.
Noted anti-lynching advocate, Ida B. Wells-Barnett,
posited, “The way to right wrongs is to turn the light of truth
upon them.”406 Transparency is vital to safeguarding equity
through design and must be the first step. If an algorithm is
used in the criminal justice system and has been hacked, it is a
defective product that harms everyone. Tort law must rapidly
adapt to allow plaintiffs theories of accountability and liability
through tort reform under state and federal law. The goal is to
understand our biases and work with them, rather than hide
from them. AI in criminal justice will need law and tech to
reduce biases, improve justice, and achieve fairness.

404. See FOER, supra note 24, at 77 (“That’s why Facebook has so few
qualms about performing rampant experiments on its users. The whole effort
is to make human beings predictable—to anticipate their behavior, which
makes them easier to manipulate.”); id. at 220 (“Machines are increasingly
suggesting the most popular topics for human inquiry, and humans are
increasingly obeying.”).
405. Oscar Wilde wrote in his 1889 essay, The Decay of Lying that “Life
imitates Art far more than Art imitates Life.” OSCAR WILDE, THE DECAY OF
LYING 10 (1891).
406. LORI AMBER ROSSENER ET AL., POLITICAL PIONEER OF THE PRESS 117
(2018).

